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This dissertation examines the role of household resource allocation on individual
human capital accumulation. The main contributions of the dissertation is providing
evidence first that families play an active role on individual investment and second that
cost and benefit within the household are not shared evenly among members.
First, using multiple births as an exogenous shift in family size, I investigate the im-
pact of the number of children on child investment and child well-being. Using data from
the 1980 US Census Five-Percent Public Use Micro Sample, 2SLS results demonstrate that
parents facing a change in family size reallocate resources in a way consistent with Becker’s
Quantity and Quality model. A larger family generated by a twin on a later birth reduces
the likelihood that older children attend private school, increases the likelihood that chil-
dren share a bedroom, reduces the mother’s labor force participation, and increases the
likelihood that parents divorce. The impact of family size on measures of child wellbeing,
such as educational attainment, the probability of not dropping out of school and teen
pregnancy is, however, less clear. The results do indicate that for both measures of child
investment and child well being, the 2SLS estimates are statistically distinguishable from
OLS estimates indicating an omitted variables bias in the single equation model.
Second, using data from the National Health Interview (NHIS) and Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), I examine the effect of female employment and
predictors of obesity for married men and women. I use the fact that there is a clear
relationship between female labor force participation (FLFP) and age structure of children
in the household in order to identify the impact of FLFP. When children are small mothers
tend to stay at home; later when children start kinder garden or school mothers are able
to come back to paid activities. I find that for married men with less than high school,
female employment raises their Body Mass Index (BMI). However I do not find evidence
that female employment increases women’s BMI or the likelihood of obesity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since Becker’s formalization of a Household production model, and more generally
of an economic approach of Human behavior, there has been a growing theoretical and
empirical literature in economics addressing the household’s role in the allocation of goods
and time within the household and in specific on human capital accumulation (Pollack,
2002).
Part of this growing interest in how families combine time and markets goods to
produce more basic commodities not only comes from the natural intellectual curiosity to
test the strong prediction in Becker’s benchmark models but also for the unprecedented
changes that families have faced during the last fifty years such as the increasing movement
of woman out of home, delaying in the time of the first marriage and reduction of fertility
among others (Hotz, Klerman and Willis, 1997). All these changes bring on a still open
questions about how the families have reacted to these changes and who if there is someone
in particular in the family, bearing the cost or benefits associated to this process. In fact,
the recognition that allocation rules within the household may not always protect the
most vulnerable members is of great significance for the selection and design of policies.
Chapter 2 addresses an old issue that comes from Becker’s seminal quantity & quality
model; Do families with more children invest less per child? There is wide-spread accep-
tance of a trade-off between number of children and ”child quality” implied by Becker’s
model. However the degree of empirical support of this relationship depends on the vari-
ables that have been used as measures of quality and the data used. To date, the literature
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has been characterized in large part by three common elements. First, not all but most
studies on the tradeoff between child quality and quantity have been conducted using data
from developing countries. Second, there is a strong tendency to equate ”child quality”
with either measures of child wellbeing. However, when Becker speaks about quality he
is specifically addressing child investment. The effects on child wellbeing will depend on
other factors. Finally, and importantly most of the literature has a tendency to think
about changes in the number of children as affecting only resources related to investment
in children. However, most standard models of the family (either the Unitary model or the
more recent bargaining models) suggest that changes in resources or resource requirements
will affect all family members and other factors determine how much children are affected
relative to other family members. One empirical example is that studies using time di-
aries show that when parents are faced with shortages of time they first spend less time
cleaning, cooking and less time sleeping but protect time spent with children. (Bianchi,
2005).In this chapter by using US Census data for the year 1980 and multiple births as
source of variation in family size finds evidence that supports Becker’s model. An exoge-
nous increase in family size reduces the probability of a child attending private school,
increases the probability of sharing bedroom, lowers the labor participation of the child’s
mother and raises the probability of divorce. However for a second group of variables that
I believe more closely related to child well-being, such as highest grade attended, grade
retention, teen pregnancy or likelihood of dropping out school, I do not find evidence that
family size has an impact.
In chapter 3 essentially I try to answer what happened with husband weight when
wives return to the labor market. The literature addressing the rapid growth in the
incidence in obesity in the US seems to center the attention on the supply of calories or
2
on technologic factors accounting for the rise in obesity. In this chapter I explore another
potential cause, which is the very large rise in female labor force participation over the
last 40 years. A household production models predict that as female wages rise (closing
the gap with male wages) wives will spend more time in the labor market and less time in
household production. While families with higher incomes can afford better quality food
(”less caloric”) and they have a higher demand for health, families with lower income will
be able to afford only caloric intensive food such as fast-food. Using the National Health
Interview (NHIS) I find that female employment has a positive impact on Body Mass
Index (BMI) for married men with less than high school. However I do not find a impact
for all samples of women or men with high school or more. This finding is consistent
with men facing an increase in the cost of home cooking with a positive impact on body
weight. Women face an offsetting rise in the level of physical activity and households
with husbands with more income i.e more levels of education can afford prepared food
with less calories. The magnitude of these findings is larger than found elsewhere in the
literature. This is primarily because I take account of the endogeneity of female labor force
participation. The analysis from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
survey reveals that married men with less than high school or married men with college
degree or more face an increase in their BMI and the likelihood of being obese if they live
in states with a positive shock in female labor demand. The results also show that for
married men with higher levels of education female demand shocks produce an increase
in the levels of physical activity. This last element plus the positive impact of female
demand shocks on BMI and obesity rate suggests that the channel through which female
labor force participation raises a man’s weight must be through a higher consumption of
calories which is consistent with a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables that we find
3
associated to female demand shocks for this group.
Finally Chapter 5 provide the conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Impact of Family Size on Investment in Child Quality: Multiple Births as a
Natural Experiment
2.1 Overview
During the last forty, years a multidisciplinary research effort has shown the essen-
tial role that family background (parents’ education, parents’ age, marital status, family
income, parents’ employment, fertility, type of neighborhood, etc.) in the educational
attainment and future economics success of children (Haverman and Wolfe, 1995). In
particular, the relationship between family size and children’s outcomes is conventionally
addressed in what is known as the “quantity-quality” model (Becker, 1960; Becker and
Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986).1 The key insight of this model is that the
number of children in the household (quantity) and child investment (quality) are deter-
mined by parents in a framework similar in many ways to the one in which households
decide their demand for any other generic commodity. However, quantity and quality are
linked in a way unlike other commodities: their shadow prices are cross–related such that
an exogenous increase in the demand for either of these two factors produces an increase
1As Haveman and Wolfe (1995) point out, Becker’s model of home investments in children can be
considered as one of four main research lines when child outcomes are restricted to scholastic achievements.
The other three lines that are mentioned are: a) Estimates of intergenerational income correlations through
improved measures of father’s earnings and adjustment for life–cycle bias; b) Research using siblings to
control for common family influences on children’s attainment; c) Research that attempts to address
measurement error problems through estimating the reliability and validity of survey reports of family
variables.
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in the “cost” of the other factor.2
A direct implication of the model is a trade–off between child investment and num-
ber of children in the family. In the empirical literature, however, this negative influence
of family size has been often studied at the level of child wellbeing. Nevertheless, inde-
pendently of the outcomes that have been used the evidence has supported a negative
influence of family size even on measures of child wellbeing. However there is still doubt
among researchers whether this observed impact is causal, given the simultaneity of fer-
tility and child outcomes.3 Additionally, the link between child wellbeing and family size
is less clear when families are able to reallocate resources among different types of child
investment. Many studies that have addressed the endogeneity of family size, and find
a negative impact of family size on child wellbeing, have been done for undeveloped or
developing economies where we can assume that families have fewer degrees of freedom to
reallocate resources.
In this paper, I study the impact of family size on two groups of variables. The first
group consists of variables that measure investments in children. Although their impacts
on child wellbeing is not empirically clear, these variables reflect the allocation of house-
hold resources by parents or other household members. The second group of variables are
2If we assume that there is no discrimination between children in the household, a family that chooses
high levels of investment in child quality would face a higher “cost” if it decided to have an additional
child since the desired quality for that child is high. Similarly, and keeping the assumption that there are
no differences in quality among children within the household, a family that has a preference for a large
family size would face a higher cost of increasing the quality of its children as the additional cost of raising
quality applies to more children.
3Despite doubts about the causal relationships between these two variables, we see that many times it
is assumed as one of the benefits of family planning that households will invest more in children’s human
capital once a smaller family size is reached.
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more traditional measures of child wellbeing that are thought to be alterable by a familiy’s
investments in their children, not necessarily they reflect household’s investment. Follow-
ing Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a, 1980b), I use multiple births as source of variation
in family size. In particular I make use of an event of multiple births on the second or
higher birth as an exogenous shock to family size. Using data from the 1980 US Census 5-
percent Public Use Micro Samples data, I demonstrate that parents who have experienced
an exogenous change in family size re-allocate resources consistent with Becker’s Quantity
& Quality model. An additional younger sibling reduces the likelihood that older siblings
attend a private school, reduces their mother’s labor force participation, increases the
likelihood their parent’s divorce and, makes it more likely that children share a bedroom.
In contrast to the results linking family size to investments, I find little evidence that
an exogenous change in family size alters measures of child wellbeing such as educational
attaintment, the probability of not dropping out of school and teen pregnancy. Moreover,
for the sub-sample of non-white children with young mothers, family size has a positive
impact on highest completed grade. This suggest that while larger families induce parents
to rearrange child inputs, parents do this in a way that may not affect child outcomes.
I do however find evidence that single equation estimates of the quantity/quality trade-
off in both the child investments and child well being models are subject to an omitted
variable bias. In nearly all cases, the 2SLS estimates of the impact of family size on child
investments and outcomes are statistically distinguishable from their OLS counterparts.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a brief literature
review. Section three explains the empirical methodology used to address the problem
of identification. The fourth section describes how the variables and samples have been
constructed and provides a descriptive analysis. Section five presents the results and
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section six, the conclusions.
2.2 Previous Empirical Evidence
The literature linking family size and child wellbeing can be cataloged into three
groups of studies based on the measures of child quality. The first line of research has used
scholastic achievements (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Blake, 1981; Hauser and Sewell,
1986; Hanushek, 1992; Hill and O’ Neill, 1994) or cognitive development (Belmont and
Morolla, 1973; Wolfe, 1982) as measures of child quality. In general, these studies find
that children from larger families have lower academic performance than children from
smaller families.
A second line of research has used labor outcomes, such as wages or labor force
participation as measures of quality (Duncan, 1968; Wachtel, 1975; Brittain, 1977; Ol-
neck and Bills, 1979; Kessler, 1991). The main assumption behind these studies is that
child quality is directly linked to future labor market success. Therefore, children from
households with more siblings would be more likely to have lower wages and lower labor
force participation. These studies find little evidence of an impact of family size on wages
or labor force participation. For example, Kessler (1991) using the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLSY) 1979-1987, finds that mothers from small families work less when they
are young and more when they are mature compared to mothers that come from bigger
families; however this is eventually explained by differences in the number of children that
these two groups of mothers have.
Finally, a third group of studies relate family size to the intergenerational trans-
mission of wealth (Tomes, 1981; Pestieau, 1984). Although the primary interest of these
studies has been to analyze the equalizing role of inheritance and the substitution be-
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tween human capital and inherited material wealth, these studies find that family size has
a negative impact on per-capita bequests.
Despite the differences in the measures of child quality employed by these studies,
there are three elements that generate doubts about whether most of the studies have
identified a causal impact of family size on child “quality”.
First, Becker’s quantity and quality model is a model of investment where house-
holds decide the level of resources allocated per child (quality). The model assumes these
investments lead to higher levels of child quality. The empirical evidence to date has pri-
marily provided evidence about the impact of fertility on outcomes of investment rather
than the investments themselves. Outcomes such as educational attainments or future
labor market outcomes are produced with many inputs, home production being one. In
fact, the introduction of home production and therefore the division of time between home
and market activities introduces an additional ambiguity to the overall impact of family
size; parents facing an exogenous change in fertility could substitute market investment for
home investment activities such that they minimize the overall impact on child wellbeing.
For example, a shift in family size increases the cost of maternal labor force participa-
tion inducing an increase in the average number of hours that mothers spend with their
children, and therefore has a likely positive impact on child’s development. On the other
hand, the reduction in mother’s labor force participation might reduce the total amount of
resources in the household. In fact, the empirical evidence supports the claim that fertility
has a negative impact on female labor participation (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; An-
grist and Evans, 1996). However, the impact on child wellbeing is still ambiguous. Some
empirical evidence shows the impact of the mother’s work behavior as not statistically
significant (Hayes and Kamerman, 1983; Hayns, 1982; Hanushek, 1992). However Hill
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and O’Neill (1994) find that an increase in the mother’s hours at work has a significant
negative effect on her child’s achievements where this effect is only partially compensated
for by a higher income. Also, Leibowitz (1974) demonstrates that the quantity and quality
of a mother’s time spent in preschool home education has a significant and positive impact
on her child’s IQ.
Second, although the quantity and quality trade–off has been the leading view re-
garding the relationship between family size and child’s success, we can postulated a
different type of relationship that does not necessarily imply a negative impact of the
number of children in the household on their present and future achievements. For ex-
ample, in a household there is a process of interaction among siblings, this socialization
might imply that children learn from each other such that the “price“ of quality could
decrease with family size. In particular, we could think that although older siblings may
perceive a reduction in their wellbeing as they have more siblings, they may obtain skills
(for example responsibility, leadership, etc.) that could be highly profitable in the future.4
Consistent with an alternative relationship, Zanjonc (1976) formalize that family size does
not matter per se but rather the predominant interaction within family’s members. These
different channels through which quantity might act on child wellbeing make the over all
impact of family size on child welfare even more ambiguous.
Third, while many studies show a negative correlation between family size and child
achievement, there is some reservation whether this quantity-quality relationship is causal.
The issue stems directly from the model that establishes a simultaneous determination of
quantity and quality, explained in more detail in the following sections. In order to solve
4In fact, we can conjecture a richer model where there are external effects associated with number of
children such that the overall impact on child quality is positive.
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this problem Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a, 1980b) use the occurrence of multiple births
(twins) in the household as an identification strategy. Thus, using the ratio of twin births
over the total number of pregnancies as a proxy of children price in one study, and a
dummy variable that accounts for the occurrence of multiple births as an instrument in
the other study, they estimate the impact of family size on child achievement and mothers’
labor participation, respectively. The results of these two studies reveal that an exogenous
change in family size has: a) a negative impact on levels of schooling for all children in
the family unit in a national sample of 2,939 farm households in India (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1980a) and ; b) a negative impact on labor participation for a sample of 12,605
U.S. women 5 (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980b).
In order to address the endogenous nature of family size, I appeal to multiple births
as a natural experiment. Although this source of identification has already been used
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980a 1980b; Black et al., 2005), this research enhances the
literature in two ways. First, I use data from a developed country U.S. Census data for
the year 1980. Therefore, unlike previous studies that use data from developing countries,
I use households that are likely to have more degrees of freedom when facing changes in
fertility, such that changes in family size are more likely to affect type of investment than
child wellbeing. In fact, Black et al. (2005) using administrative data for Norway find
that once birth order is taken in account and the variable twin births is used as instrument
the effect of number of children on children’s educational attaintment is negligible or non
existent when birth order is taken in to account. Second and related to the previous
point, in order to reduce the chance of Type II error, I make an explicit distinction in
5A national random sample of women containing detailed information about life-cycle pregnancy out-
comes. For more details see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b).
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the impact of an increase in the number of children on variables that can be linked to
child investment (quality) from other variables that might be considered as outputs of
investment which probably are closer to wellbeing but do not necessarily reflect directly
the allocation of resources by the parents. Up to date Conley (2004) using the 1990
Census data and sibling sex composition as source of variation in family size is one of
the few studies that not only analyzes the impact of number of children on outcomes of
investment but also investment. Conley’s results reveal that number of children not only
reduces the probability of attending private school (investment) but also increases the
likelihood of being “held back” (output).
2.3 Empirical Methodology
The following bivariate regression model represents a simpler version of the causal
relationship I want to estimate,
yi = α+ γni + εi i = 1, . . . , T (2.1)
where yi represents a measure of child investment (inputs into the production of child
quality) or a measure of child wellbeing, ni represents family size, i indexes observation,
and for simplicity in the exposition other covariates are left implicit.
The impact of family size on child quality is measured by γ. The intuition of Becker’s
Quality and Quantity model suggests that OLS estimates of this equation may be subject
to an omitted variable bias since the cov(ni, εi) is not zero
6. According to the Becker
6For the simplest case where child quality depends only on family size, OLS over–estimates the trade–
off since plim((N ′N)ε/T ) < 0, with N the column vector of the family size. Families that have a higher
amount of children are not only families that face a higher shadow price for child quality but are also
families with a higher relative preference for family size over child quality. Simultaneously, families with
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model, households with a higher number of children are those that face a higher shadow
price for child quality and therefore choose lower level of quality per child. However, those
families with more children are more likely to be the ones with higher preferences for
number of children or lower cost associated to family size, independent of the preferred
level of child investment. In the same way, families with few children face a lower shadow
price for child quality and therefore are more likely to invest more in child quality. Those
families that choose higher levels of child investment may be more likely to have a higher
preference for child quality i.e a higher cost for family size. Therefore, statistical inference
about the impact of family size on child quality using differences in the average level of
quality between families with different family size will be biased because we do not account
for these households having not only different prices but also having different preferences
for family size and child quality.
Following Rosenzweig andWolpin (1980a, 1980b), I use multiple births I use multiple
birth as source of variation in family size. In specific I use the event of multiple births on
the second or higher birth as an exogenous change in family size. Women who experience a
multiple birth have some ability to adjust their subsequent fertility. For example, a mother
that would like four children may simply quit having children if on her third birth she
delivers twins. Given the limited size of most families in the US, however, multiple births
will shift the number of children for most families. Therefore multiple births would not
only provide a shift in the number of children in the family but also should be orthogonal
to the child quality preferences.
fewer children are the ones with a lower price for child quality but are also the ones with a higher preference
for child quality reinforcing the impact on child quality where this last impact is captured by ε. However,
for a more general case where child quality depends not only on family size more assumptions are required
to sign the bias.
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There are two types of twins, the most common of the multiple pregnancy: identical
(monozygotic) and fraternal (non–identical, dizygotic). Identical twins occur when a single
embryo divides in two embryos. Identical twins have the same genetic makeup and its
incidence is equal in all races, ages groups and countries (3.5 per 1000 births). Fraternal
twins occur when two separate eggs are fertilized by separate sperms. The occurrence of
fraternal twins, unlike identical twins, varies and there are several risk factors that may
contribute. First, the incidence is higher among the Afro–American population. Second,
non–identical twin women give birth to twins at rate of 1 set per 60 births, which is higher
than the rate of 1 of every 90 births, at the national level. Fourth, women between 35 to
40 years of age with four or more children are three times more likely to have twins than
a woman under 20 without children. Finally, multiple births are more common among
women who utilize fertility medication. Given the period under analysis(where fertility
drugs are not an issue), the most concerning of these factors, in our case, is the hereditary
factors for which I cannot control (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2004).
However, there is not priori information that women are acting differently based in this
hereditary information or that hereditary factors are associated to a particular group of
the population.
However, the way that I use of multiple births limits the sample I use in the analysis.
I restrict attention to the oldest child in the household who is not a multiple birth child
but has at least one younger sibling. These children are all from families that planned on
having a second child, but may not have banked on having a third. More importantly, by
focusing our attention on the oldest child, we examine children affected by multiple births
through family size rather than through others factors directly related to being part of
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a multiple birth7. For example, among twins and higher order multiple birth children,
i.e. triplets, quadruplets, etc., rates of low birth weight and infant mortality are 4 to
33 times higher compared to singleton births. Moreover, twins and other higher order
multiple births are more likely to suffer life–long disabilities when they survive (National
Vital Statistics Report, 1999). Therefore, the sample is restricted to oldest siblings in
the household that are not from a multiple birth since being part of a multiple birth or
being a younger sibling of twins or other higher order multiple birth is conditional on the
occurrence of multiple births in the household (post–treatment). However it seems a waste
of information and therefore power, keeping only the oldest sibling and not considering
all sibling that were before the twin birth, I prioritize bias over precision. Families, that
face an event of multiple births are those families with a greater chances to face this event
in a following pregnancy. The restriction of the sample to oldest siblings is important
because there is some evidence that the trade–off between quantity and quality may be
lower for the oldest child, since the first born child, at least for sometime, would belong to
a smaller family than the rest of the siblings, thereby generating an advantage for them
(Kessler, 1991). For that reason the impact that is found in the following analysis may
be considered as a lower bound of the average impact of multiple birth for the complete
sample of children. Therefore the observational unit in equation (1.1) is the oldest child
7It is important to keep in mind that the event of multiple births not only increases the number of
children in the household but also reduces the timing among siblings that belong to a multiple births to
zero. Therefore an estimate of γ using multiple births as identification strategy will produce an estimate
for the joint treatment. A priori the overall impact of a change in timing on child investment and child
wellbeing is not clear. On the one hand the reduction in timing may be associated with an increase in
physical, financial and psycho–social stress for parents that has a negative effect on child investment and
child wellbeing. On the other hand there may exist some scale economies that reduce the average cost of
child investment.
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(sibling) in the household that does not belong to a multiple birth and has at least one
additional sibling.
Let mbi s denote the binary instrument, multiple birth, that takes a value equal to
one for families where the oldest child is followed by a multiple birth and zero if followed
by a singleton sibling in the s birth. The Instrumental Variable (IV) estimate of γ in the
equation is the Wald estimate
ˆγIV =
y¯1 − y¯0
n¯1 − n¯0
, (2.2)
where y¯1 represents the mean of yi for the observations with mbi s = 1 and the
other terms are similarly defined.
Whether or not the occurrence of multiple births is an appropriate instrument de-
pends on the legitimacy of the following two assumptions. The first one is that the
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable is different from zero.
The second one, non-testable, is no correlation between the instrument and the error term
in the regression. The first assumption implies that there should be enough correlation
between multiple births and family size (formally, cov(ni,mbi s) 6= 0), so an average differ-
ence in family size (n¯1− n¯0) exists and can be measured properly. The second assumption
implies that there should not be a correlation between multiple births and the error term
(formally, cov(εi,mbi s) = 0), so that any impact that is observed over the variable of
interest (y¯1 − y¯0), should be necessarily attributed to a change in family size. Therefore,
if both assumptions hold, a causal relationship between family size and the outcome, y,
can be identified.
Despite the fact that the second assumption is non-testable, the random nature of
multiple births, the choice of the observational unit under analysis (oldest child in the
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household that does not belong to a multiple birth), the inclusion of other variables that
are correlated with the incidence of multiple births such as age of the mother, race and
parents’ education,8 as well as the analysis of the impact of twining in a specific birth, s,
make it more likely that this assumption holds.
The impact of family size on child outcomes, as it is presented in equation (1),
is constant across observations. This assumption may be unrealistic given the obvious
heterogeneity in households’ preferences. An extensive literature in program evaluation
has mentioned the importance of addressing this heterogeneity in the impact of a specific
“treatment”. Heckman (1997) calls attention to the role of the heterogeneity and the
sensitivity of IV to assumptions about how individuals internalize this heterogeneity in
their decisions of being part of the treated group (i.e. the selection of family size). Imbens
and Angrist (1994) have shown that IV estimates can be interpreted as “Local Average
Treatment Effects” (LATE) in a setting with heterogeneity in the impacts and with indi-
viduals that act recognizing this heterogeneity. In this case, γIV identifies the impact of
an increase in family size on child quality for those families that have had more children
than they otherwise would have because they had multiple births.9 Therefore, as Imbens
8Mothers with more education tend to postpone childbearing increasing the likelihood of multiple births.
9Although multiple births can be considered as a random event, it has been shown that the use of
fertility drugs increases the likelihood of this event. Additionally, it can be argued that the use of fertility
drugs could be associated with households with a higher preference for children and their quality. Under
this last assumption, the LATE estimate associated with multiple births would be measuring the average
impact for this specific group of households rather than the impact of family size for a more representative
group of households. In fact there is a broad acknowledgement that the rate of multiple births has increased
in the last two decades, which has been attributed jointly to a higher use of fertility drugs and a change in
the timing of the first birth. A closer look at the evolution of the twin ratio (total twin births over total
number of births, per 1000), reveals that the explosive increase in multiple births did not begin before 1985
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and Angrist pointed out, LATE is dependent on the instrument that is being used.
2.4 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics
The primary data for this project is the 1980 Census Five-Percent Public Use Micro
Sample (PUMS). The selection of this data source, and the particular year, is based
on three facts. First, for this particular year, the census provides information about a
respondent’s age and quarter of birth that can be used to identify twin births. Second,
since multiple births are rare, I need a large sample in order to have adequate statistical
power. As I show below approximately 1.8% of all births are multiple births and less
than 1% of all oldest children in our sample belong to households with a multiple birth.
However, the two samples that provide the core of our results contain between seven
hundred and three hundred thousand observations. Finally, census data provides a rich
set of variables that allows me to construct different measures of child investment and
child wellbeing.
The observational unit is the oldest sibling in a household that does not belong to a
multiple birth and lives in a family with at least one additional sibling. Therefore I have
one observation per family for the sub-sample of families with two or more children. For
each of these children, I construct information about child investment and child wellbeing,
the total number of siblings in the household, as well as other socioeconomic variables
such as parents’ education, race, state of residence, etc. that may be correlated with their
investments in their children.
(Martin and Park, 1999). Therefore, since we are working with children that were younger than eighteen
years old in 1980, i.e. born between 1962 and 1980, it seems reasonable to rule out that multiple births
were mainly associated with households that had been using fertility drugs and therefore with a greater
preference for children quality.
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The number of children in a family is defined as the number of children younger
than eighteen years old that have the same non step mother that for simplicity from
here onward I call biological mother. This number of children can be lower than the real
number of children in the family since I do not observe older siblings who are no longer
living at home. I delete families where it is not possible to identify the biological mother
in the household. This restriction avoids problem that blended families may have two
children with the same age and quarter of birth that “look” like twins in the data but
have different mothers.
The Becker model establishes that child quality is positively related to particular
types of investments in children and exogenous shocks in family size will alter the level
of per child investment and hence child quality. It is difficult to define and measure what
is meant by child quality, and although it is a subjective concept, we can agree that
child quality is multidimensional. Likewise, there are numerous types of investments or
expenditures we could make on children that we hope might improve their chances of
success in education, the job market, the marriage market, etc. The distinction between
inputs and outcomes is essential for my analysis and as a result, I estimate models with
two different sets of outcomes. The first group are variables that I associate with child
investment (inputs for child quality), are variables that reflect allocation of resources to
children. The second group, variables that I relate to child wellbeing (outputs of child
quality), are variables that may use “child investment” as an input but are not necessarily
able to capture changes in allocation of resources by household members. An example of
variables in this second group, is the set of variables related to scholastic achievements.
While scholastic achievements may be affected by child investment, i.e. time assigned
by parents, school type, family structure, etc., they do not necessarily show a change in
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allocation by the family and also they might be affected by other factors such as child
ability.
We can postulate lists of investments and outcomes, but without knowing the pro-
duction process, we do not know whether the postulated outcomes are determined by the
investments. In past research, almost all researchers have focused on testing the Becker
model by examining the tradeoff between family size and outcomes. A more direct test
would be to examine whether the inputs are determined by exogenous shocks to family
size. Focusing on inputs is a more powerful test than using outcomes since inputs are
one step closer to assessing the effects of family size in the causal chain, and reducing the
chance of Type II errors.
For the group of variables that can be seen as child investment I define seven variables
that although their relationship with child wellbeing is not always clear are under the
control of the parents and therefore reflect their allocation of resources. The first variable
“Attends Private School” is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if a child
between 6 and 18 years of age attends a private institution or church related school,
and zero otherwise. Numerous authors have demonstrated that educational outcomes are
higher for students that attend private school. In fact, Evans and Schwab (1995) find that
a typical student attending a Catholic high school has a greater chance of finishing high
school and entering a four-year college. Although there is some question about whether
this impact is causation or correlation, there is no question that parents who enroll their
children in private schools are the ones with higher income. I also define a second variable,
“Nursery”, for children younger than six years old. It takes a value equal to one for children
that are attending school and zero otherwise. Studies for developing countries reveal that
children attending nursery school have better performances on reading and math tests, as
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well as a lower failure rate during their first year in elementary school (Pozner, 1982; Filp
et al. 1984).
The following variable, “Migrate”, takes a value of one if a child’s mother has moved
counties over the past five years and zero otherwise.
The fifth variable, “Share bedroom”, is a dummy variable equal to one if the num-
ber of children in the household is higher than the number of “available” bedrooms for
children, where “available” bedrooms is the total number of bedrooms minus the number
of bedrooms allocated to parents and other adults in the household.
Two variables that are potentially measures of investment are the mother’s labor
force participation and hours of work.10 As was mentioned above, the impact of mother’s
labor force participation on child wellbeing is ambiguous. Working mothers may spend less
time with their children but have more income that could be allocated to child investment.
Independent of this ambiguity an important aspect of these two variables is the information
provided about the substitution from market goods to home production.
The final measure of child investment is the dummy variable “Divorce” that takes a
value one if the child’s mother is currently divorced, separated or is in their second or higher
marriage, and zero otherwise.11 Brown and Flinn (2002) demonstrate the simultaneous
interaction between child quality and the decision to divorce in their model of the family
dynamics. Parents receive utility from child quality; as a result, exogenous increases in
child quality makes divorce more costly. Simultaneously, a reduction in the likelihood of
getting divorced motivates a higher investment in child quality. Empirical evidence has
10While labor force participation has been defined for the complete sample, “hours at work” has been
defined only for the sample of mothers that are employed.
11To ensure that I capture the impact of increasing family size on family structure I restrict the sample
to oldest children that were born while their parents were married.
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long shown that children of divorced parents have lower achievement than children from
intact families (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Manski et al. (1992), using the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY), found that living in an intact family increases the
chances of high school completion. Ginther and Pollak (2003) show that there are no
differences in educational outcomes between stepchildren and their half-siblings who are
the joint biological children of both parents. However, children that belong to “blended”
families have lower outcomes than children that live in traditional “nuclear” families where
all children have the same biological parents. These results support McLanahan and
Sandefur (1994) finding of similar outcomes between stepchildren and children in families
with a single parent.
Because of data limitations in the Census PUMS, there are only four variables
that measure child wellbeing. The first is the “Highest Grade” which is the highest grade
completed for those currently not enrolled in school or the current grade for those currently
in school. This outcome has been defined for all children between six and eighteen years
old. I exclude from this definition children younger than six years old in order to avoid
noise that reflects the participation in nursery school. The second output variable is named
“Behind” which is a dummy variable that equals one if the highest completed grade is lower
than the mode by age in years, quarter of birth and state, and zero otherwise.12 “Behind”
identifies whether children are progressing in class with their cohort and is a measure of
educational attainment. Children who repeat a class are often at risk of dropping out of
high school. The quantity-quality model would predict a negative impact of additional
children on the highest completed grade and a positive impact on the probability of being
12Age has been measured in quarters and the idea of using as reference the mode by age and state, is
to capture the heterogeneity in the rules about when a child can start school. These rules differ among
states and they are usually a function of the quarter of birth of the child.
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behind. The third variable, “Attend School”, is defined for the sub-group of children
between sixteen and eighteen years old. This variable takes a value equal to one if an
individual attends school and zero otherwise. This variable captures the probability of
not being a drop out. The fourth variable “Have Children” is a dummy variable defined
for girls between thirteen and eighteen years old. This variable takes a value equal to one
if a girl has had a child and zero otherwise. This variable aims to capture the impact of
the number of young siblings in the household on the probability of teenage childbearing.
The latter has been related many times to low future labor market outcomes.
Following Bronars and Grogger (1994) and Angrist and Evans (1998), I identify
multiple births by exploiting the fact that the 1980 census reports age in years as of April
1, 1980 (the first day of the second quarter) plus the quarter of birth. If two or more
children in the household have the same age, quarter of birth and biological mother, I
assume that these children are twins. To study potential heterogeneity in the impact of
the number of children, I construct two sub-samples: oldest children with one or more
siblings and oldest children with two or more siblings. For the first of these sub-samples
the instrument is defined as mbi 2, and takes a value equal to one if the second birth in
the family is a multiple birth and zero otherwise. For the sub-sample of children who
belong to families with three or more children, the instrument is defined as mbi 3, and
takes a value equal to one if the third pregnancy in the household is a multiple birth and
zero otherwise.
Table 2.1 presents the proportion of multiple births for the complete sample of
children younger than eighteen years old. Using the algorithm outlined above, I classify
1.8% of these children as multiple births of which 1.77% are twins. These percentages are
quite close to numbers reported by the National Vital Statistical Service (NVSS) showing
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that 1.95% of births over the 1962 to 1968 period were twins and 1.86% of births for the
period 1971 to 1979 were twins.
Multiple births not only increases the number of children in the household but also
reduce the spacing among siblings that belong to a multiple birth to zero. Therefore an
estimate of γ using multiple births as an identification strategy will produce an estimate
for the joint treatment i.e. an increase in number of children and a change in children
spacing. While multiple births change birth spacing for all families that face a multiple
birth, only for some families this event produces a change in the completed family size.
For some families, likely the ones with the number of children closer to the desired family
size, the event of a multiple births will produce a change in family size and a reduction
in the space among sibling that belong to a multiple birth to zero. For other families,
probably the ones far from a desired family size, the event of multiple births produces
only a change in the spacing among children. In previous sections, when the theoretical
relation between quality and quantity was explained, it was done in the context of a static
model where ni is the total number of children that the family has decided to have when
fertility is completed. However, empirically what is observed is the number of children
that a family has at a particular moment rather than the completed number of children.
In order to study this heterogeneity in the treatment, the samples are divided by the
mother’s age: all children, children with mothers that are 32 years old or younger, and
children with mothers that are older than 32 years at the time of the census.13 While
13In the ideal world we would like either to consider only women that have reached the desired family
size or to know the desired family size. A potential way to do it is constraining the sample to children
with mothers older than forty years old. However by constraining the sample in this way we are keeping
household where is more likely that some of the children had already left home. According with US Census
Bureau information, in 1980 there were approximately 3.6 millions births. From this birth less than 5%
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multiple births would likely be an exogenous increase in the number of children and child
spacing for older mothers, (who are closer to reaching the desired family size or already),
for younger mothers multiple births might only change the timing of their third child.
Tables 2.2 to 2.4 present the descriptive statistics for the samples of all children;
children with “younger” mothers and children with “older” mothers. For the sample of
all children the average age of a child is approximately eleven years old. However, if I
restrict the sample to children who are older than six years old (i.e. those in school age),
the average age is thirteen years old. On average, children in the sample are in eighth
grade which is consistent with the average age observed. Both parents have approximately
high school as their highest completed grade and for the sample of all children (without a
restriction in family size), I observe an average of 1.88 children in the household. African
Americans and Hispanics are over–represented in the sample of families with three or more
children. It is notable that the number of children is higher for families with older mothers,
which at least partially reflects that households with older mothers have completed fertility.
When I split the sample by family size and mother’s age, I reproduce the empirical
regularity that the occurrence of multiple births increases as family size and mother’s age
increase: while approximately 1% of the oldest children in the complete sample belong to
families with multiple births, when the sample is restricted to oldest children with older
mothers and with three or more children in the household, I find that almost 4% of the
children belong to families with multiple births.
For the variables linked to outputs of child quality I find that when the sample is
restricted to families with three or more children, there is a small increase in the proportion
happen to women older than 35 years and less than 20% to women older than 30 years. In this way I take
32 years old as cut off to divide the sample among women that are fader or closer of complete fertility.
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of teen pregnancy and in the proportion of children with a grade lower than the mode
(14%), as well as a lower fraction of children between 16 and 18 years old that attend
school, which is consistent with a negative impact of number of children.
A comparison of these numbers with national data for the year 1980 reveals some
differences between the two set of numbers. The Alan Guttmacher Institute reports that
nationwide for 1980, approximately 11% of teen women were mothers, which is higher
than the 3% that I observe in our sample. Also it looks as if we get a high proportion of
dropouts (approx. 20%). These differences can be explained in part by the construction
of the sample. I have selected children for whom we are able to identify their mothers and
who also have one or more siblings. Therefore, teen mothers that have left their parents,
and for whom I cannot identify their mothers, or who do not have a sibling at home are
missed in this study. For the proportion of drop-out our estimates are slightly higher.
McMillen et al.(1994) show that approximately 15% of children between 16 and 24 years
old have not finished high school or were not enrolled in school in 1980. The explanation
may be related to the group age considered. In fact, if I restricted the sample to children
between 16 and 18 years old, the proportion of dropouts should rise. Therefore 20% of
dropout students for the population of children between 16 and 18 years old is a reasonable
proportion given the previous evidence.
For the variables used as inputs of child quality I find that when the sample is
restricted to larger family sizes there is a reduction in the proportion of students attending
private or church related schools (14% to 12%)14, lower maternal labor force participation
(53% to 48%) that is consistent with the increase in the proportion of children in nursery
14These proportions are similar to the 13% nationwide enrollment in private institutions for the year
1980 in grades k-12 (Digest of Education Statistics).
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school (41% to 49%), a higher fraction of children that potentially share a bedroom (19%
to 38%) and a lower number of children whose mother has migrated during the last five
years (23% to 21%). Nevertheless, it does not appear that constraining the sample to
bigger family size affects the number of hours worked or the “probability” of divorce.
Table 2.5 presents differences in means for some of the demographic variables be-
tween children that do not live in families with multiple births and the ones that do.
These differences reveal a known empirical regularity about the occurrence of multiple
births (Angrist and Evans, 1996; Mullin and Wang, 2002): parents from households with
multiple births are older, are more likely Afro–American and have a higher level of edu-
cation -after controlling for race. This finding reflects the evidence that Afro–Americans
start families earlier. That women with more years of schooling are more likely to have
twins might reflect that they were postponing childbearing to older ages, and more edu-
cated women are much more likely to postpone childbearing.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 First Stage
Table 2.6 presents the first stage regression of the number of children on multiple
births with and without covariates. The top half of the table provides the results for the
full sample of children (two or more children), while the bottom half reports the results for
families with three or more children. The first two columns present the estimates for the
complete sample of children while columns (3) to (6) show the estimates for the sample
of children with “younger” and “older” mothers. The point estimates for the impact
of multiple births in the second pregnancy (MB 2) are approximately 0.80 for the three
samples. The impacts of multiple births in the third pregnancy (MB 3) are slightly higher,
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but not statistically different than the impacts of multiple births in the second pregnancy.
For both MB 2 and MB 3 the t-statistics are over 40. Children that belong to families
with multiple births either in the second or third pregnancy have on average almost one
sibling more than other children.
The finding that multiple births in the third pregnancy have a slightly larger impact
on family size than in the second pregnancy is likely related to the fact that the sample
of households with two or more children include some households whose desired family
size is not being affected by multiple births. For these households multiple births in the
second birth affect only the timing of the third or fourth child. However, when the sample
is restricted to households with three or more children, the likelihood that multiple births
are changing family size is higher. Consistent with this explanation, point estimates for the
sub-sample of children with older mothers are lower than the estimates for the sub-sample
of children with younger mothers. The reason for this result is that the sample of children
with young mothers includes mothers for whom the impact of multiple births seems to
affect family size, however in the long run (when the desired family size is reached) does
not affect family size but only the timing of the third child.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), and Bronars and Grogger (1994) find that the
impact of multiple births disappears as the sample is constrained to older mothers. Unlike
these previous studies that used twining in the first pregnancy, in our analysis the impact
of multiple births is limited to the second and third pregnancy, where multiple births are
more likely to affect family size.
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2.5.2 Inputs and Outputs
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of the number of
children on the seven variables that I characterize as inputs and on the four variables that
I define as measures of wellbeing.
The OLS estimate for the number of children variable in the “Private School” equa-
tion shows that, contrary to the prediction of the quantity/quality model, the number of
children has a positive impact on the probability of attending private school. However,
an exogenous increase in the number of children generate by a multiple birth reduces the
probability of attending a private school by approximately 1 percentage point for children
that live in families with two or more children and 0.43 percentage points for the sample
of households with three or more children. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test reveals in both
samples, that OLS and 2SLS estimates are statistically different from each other for both
samples.15 Therefore, treating as an exogenous variable would, in this instance, produced
an inconsistent estimate and faulty inference. The positive coefficient on children OLS
model may be due to the fact that most private school seats are in religious schools, and
more religious families are both more likely to have larger families and enroll their children
in these private schools.
For the sample of households with two or more children, the 2SLS estimate of the
probability of attending nursery school shows that a shift in the number of children does
not have a statistically significant effect. However, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test shows
that this impact is statistically different from the OLS estimate by a nearly 5 percentage
15In a framework with heterogeneity in the impact of family size the interpretation of the Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test is not straight forward. OLS and 2SLS estimates would measure a potential trade–off
between family size and child investment in different parts of the distribution (Heckman and Vytlacil,
2001).
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point reduction in the probability of attending nursery school. The result for the sample
of households with three or more children confirms that an exogenous shift in family size
does not have a statistically significant impact, although this result is inconclusive since I
cannot define whether or not this impact is statistically different from OLS estimate.
Both 2SLS and OLS estimates reveal that larger families increase the chance of
the oldest child “sharing” a bedroom by a statistically significant amount. However, the
Durbin–Wu–Hausman specification test rejects equality between the OLS and IV estimates
for both samples. OLS estimates show that the impact on the probability of sharing
bedroom moves from approximately 22 to 26 percentage points as I restrict the sample of
families with more children. 2SLS estimates reveal the same pattern, however the impact
of an exogenous increase in family size that comes from the event of multiple births, is
considerable bigger for the sample of families with three or more children. For this last
sample the impact is approximately 15 percentage points bigger than the 20 percentage
points impact that I find for the sample of families with two or more children.
The results for maternal labor force participation are consistent with previous stud-
ies that have detected a statistically significant and negative impact of childbearing on
female labor force participation. The results also indicate that OLS and 2SLS estimates
are statistically different, again indicating an omitted variables bias in the single-equation
models that treat family size as exogenous. OLS estimates for the sample of mothers who
have two or more children reveal that an additional child reduced labor force participation
by 8,6 percentage points, or by approximately 7,2 percentage points. When the endoge-
nous nature of family size is considered, the impact of family size falls to 3,5 percentage
points for mothers with two or more children and 4,2 points for mothers with three or
more children. When the sample is restricted to mothers who are working, OLS estimates
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reveal that number of children reduces hours of work by approximately 4% for the sample
of households with two or more children and by 3% for the sample of households with three
or more children. Nevertheless, the 2SLS estimates show no statistically significant impact
on hours worked. However, we are able to say that this estimate is statistically different
from the OLS estimate only for the sample of households with two or more children.
A result that is particularly interesting is the impact of the number of children
on the probability of their parents get divorced. The OLS estimates suggest that more
children reduce the probability of getting divorced by approximately 2 percentage points
for the sample of households with two or more children and by 1,6 percentage points for
the sample with three or more children. However, these estimates are likely based by
the fact that more stable families are the ones that choose to have more children or in
other words, couples in order to have more children need more time together. When I
use multiple births as a source of variation in family size I find that an additional child
increases the probability of divorce by statistically precise 2,5 percentage points in the
sample of households with two or more children. This finding, and given previous evidence
that shows that children that grow up in “blended” families have lower achievements than
children that live in traditional nuclear families, suggest that probably one of the channels
through which family size is impacting child wellbeing may be through family structure.
In particular, following Brown and Flinn (2002), an increase in family size makes it more
likely of getting divorced because the lower investment in child quality reduces the cost
of splitting up16 but simultaneously because of the higher probability of divorce, parents
will have a weaker incentive to invest in their children.
16The reduction in the cost comes from the reduction in utility that parents perceive at the moment of
getting divorced since they spend less time with the children. Then they would perceive less consumption
of child’s quality that is an argument in the utility function.
31
The last four outcomes in Table 2.7 are the ones that I relate to child wellbeing.
I observe that for the log of “Highest Completed Grade” and for the dummy variable
“Behind”, OLS estimates support the conventional wisdom that number of children has a
negative impact on educational outcomes with a 0.34 to 0.49 percentage points reduction
in the highest completed grade and an increase of 1.44 to 1.91 percentage points in the
probability of having a grade lower than the mode by age and state. However, the 2SLS
estimates do not show any statistically significant impact of number of children on either
of these two outcomes in any of the samples. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test shows that
these impacts are statistically different from the OLS estimates for both outcomes in the
sample of households with two or more children, and only for highest completed grade in
the sub–sample of households with three or more children.
For the variable “Attend School”, I find inconclusive results. The 2SLS estimates
are not statistically significant for any sub–sample and not statistically different from the
OLS estimates, where the latter show that family size reduces the probability of being
enrolled by 0.94 and 1.24 percentage points for the samples of two or more children and
three or more children, respectively.
Finally for the variable “Have Children”, I observe that for both sub-samples, the
2SLS estimate for the impact of number of children is not statistically significant or sta-
tistically different from the OLS estimates.
If these last four variables were considered as measures of child quality it would
look like the Quantity–Quality model is wrong or, if it is right, there would be other
channels that produce a positive relationship between quantity and child wellbeing, and
therefore a total observed impact that is not statistically different from zero for both
samples. However, these variables are one step farther in the causal chain. In fact we can
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see these four variables as outputs of child investment. Thus, considering the investment
in child quality as a multidimensional activity that provides many degrees of freedom,
families may substitute among different types of investment such that the impact on the
final output (wellbeing) is “practically” unchanged 17. In fact, I find that as the family
size grows, the oldest child in the household is less likely to attend private school, and
more likely to share a bedroom and to belong to a “blended family”. As well, I find that
as the family grows there is a negative impact on the mother’s labor force participation.
While there is a kind of agreement about the impact of a reduction in the probability of
attending private school, the impact of the rest of the variables on child wellbeing remains
ambiguous. This ambiguity may explain the overall insignificant impact that I observe on
the variables that I link to wellbeing.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity in Results by mother’s age
I do not observe the desired family size but instead, the current number of children
that a family has at the time of the census. While multiple births are likely to increase
family size for women who experience a twin birth later in life, multiple births earlier in
a woman’s life might only affect the timing of their third (fourth) child for the sample
of households with two (three) or more children.18 However, I already showed that the
17Another possibility is to say that these variables are a bad proxy for child quality. For example, I could
think that number of children might affect school performance, but to a degree that will not necessarily
cause a child to fail a complete grade. However, even if our two educational outcomes were bad proxies
for child quality, I would expect that the impact would not be statistically different from zero, but never
positive as I find it for one of the sub–samples.
18Even if I constrain the sample to households for whom multiple births affect family size I will not be
able to avoid the double treatment (increment in number of children and reducing the timing), but at least
I ensure that the results are not driven only by changes in timing.
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event of multiple births affects family size not only for older mothers but also for younger
mothers. Nevertheless, the shift in family size may have a different impact in the short
run, when the desired family size has not been reached, to the one that would have in
the long run when it has been reached or is close to be reached. Therefore, in order
to analyze the robustness of the previous results and to study potential differences in
treatment associated with multiple births, I divide the sample by mother’s age: 32 years
old or younger and older than 32 years. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 presents the results for the
sample of children with “younger mothers” (32 years old or younger) for whom the desired
family size not necessarily has been reached, and tables 2.11 and 2.12, the results for the
sample of children with “older mothers” for whom it is more likely that the desired family
size has been reached.
The results in Tables 2.9 to 2.12 show that in qualitative terms our previous results
are robust to division by mother’s age. However, I observe that the impact on the variables
Divorce and Attend private school is not statistically significant for the sample of younger
mothers.19 Nevertheless, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman specification test for this sample still
reveals for these variables a statistical difference from the OLS estimates. In fact the
OLS estimates show that number of children has a positive impact on the probability of
attending private school and a negative influence on Divorce. I also find that the impact
on maternal labor force participation and hours of work is higher for the sample of younger
19For the sample of households with three or more children and younger mothers, I find the counterintu-
itive result that a shift in family size produces an increase in almost 3% in the probability that the oldest
sibling in the household attend private school. This results might be explained by the construction of the
sample(households with relative younger mothers that already have tree or more children) since I might be
considering families with higher preference for children and are probably over–representing families with
stronger preferences for a particular type of school, such as catholic schools.
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mothers. However, for the variable hours at work the Durbin–Wu–Hausman specification
test does not show a difference from the OLS estimates.20
As expected, on the other hand, for the sample of households with “older mothers,
I find a lower impact on the mother’s labor force participation with 2SLS estimates that
reveal a 1.7 and 3.3 percentage points reduction for the samples of two or more, and three
or more children in the household, respectively. Nevertheless, the estimates are different
from the OLS estimates only for the sample of households with two or more children. As
well, I see that this sample of children, children with older mothers, is the one driving the
results on the probability of attending private school and on the probability of getting
divorced. The 2SLS estimates for the impact on the probability of attending a private
school show that family size reduces this likelihood by 1.21 or 1.75 percentage points,
20This bigger impact on female labor force participation for the sample of younger mothers may also
reflect the impact of child age. When the samples are divided by child age I observe a bigger impact
for the sample of mothers with a younger oldest child, with a reduction in the probability of being part
of the labor force of approximately 6 percentage points. However for mothers with an oldest child older
than 12 years old I find that number of children has an insignificant impact on the mother’s labor force
participation. This result is consistent with the prediction of life cycle models of labor supply. There is a
substitution of hours allocated to the labor market along the life cycle such that there is a reduction in the
number of hours worked during childbearing that is compensated by an increase in hours worked in later
periods. Also the division of the samples according to the difference in age between the oldest sibling and
the second one(s) reveals that the impact of family size on mother’s labor force participation is bigger for
households that have a difference bigger than six years. One possible way to explain this result is to think
that part of the time that mothers allocate in taking care of the children has a public good nature. Thus
an increase in family size that makes it more costly to work and therefore reduces the labor participation
will have a lower impact for women who have children closer in age. These mothers will stay less time out
of the labor market because they can use the same time to take care of more than one child. As result,
their human capital depreciates less and so it is less costly for them to return to the labor market.
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depending on the sample. For the variable Divorce, a shift in family size produces a 3.56
and 0.96 percentage points increase in the likelihood of having faced a divorce for the
samples with two or three more children, respectively.
While the differences found in the impact on the mother’s labor force participation
between these samples may be related to the reallocation of time in the labor market over
the life–cycle, the differences in the impact on either the probability of attending private
school or the variable Divorce may be related to two factors. First, an increase in family
size as a result of multiple birth may impact these two outcomes in the long run but not in
the short run. Second, younger mothers are more likely to be the ones for whom multiple
births only produce a change in the timing of the birth but not an impact in the complete
family size. Then the evidence may be associated with the fact that the impact on these
two outcomes is through number of children but not through a change in birth spacing.
2.5.4 Heterogeneity in Results by sex and race
In this section I extend the heterogeneity analysis and examine whether the impact
of having more siblings varies across race and sex of the oldest child. In order to make the
presentation trackable, I concentrate on the five outcomes from the previous section with
the most definite results in the 2SLS models: attend private school, mother’s labor force
participation, divorce, behind and highest grade completed. Tables 2.13 to 2.16 presents
the results for the complete sample of households with two (three) or more children, and
Tables 2.17 to 2.24 present the results for the samples of children with younger and older
mothers, respectively.
For the complete sample, the results indicate that the impact of a larger family on
private school enrollment is larger for boys than for girls. Dividing the sample by mother’s
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age, I find that if there are differences by race or sex, these differences are concentrated
in the sample of older mothers.21 In fact, for this last sample, I find that the negative
impact of more children on the outcome attend private school is driven by boys and by
white children. I also find differences in the impact of children on the labor supply of the
mother based on the sex of the oldest child. Those households where the oldest child is a
boy are the ones with a bigger impact on the mother’s labor force participation.
Although for the sample of children with younger mothers I do not find a clear
difference when I divide the sample by race or sex, a result that is worth mentioning is the
impact on highest grade completed. For this variable in the sample of non-white children,
2SLS estimate reveals that an increase in family size increases the highest completed
grade by approximately 0.37 percentage points. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman specification
test allows us to say that this previous estimate is statistically different from the OLS one.
Finally, also in the sample of younger mothers, I find for the sample of white girls that
an increase in family size has a positive impact on the probability of attending a private
school for oldest children living in households with three or more children. The Durbin–
Wu–Hausman specification test, however, does not allow us to say that these impacts are
different from the corresponding OLS estimates.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper, using US census data shows that families allocate resources in a way
consistent with Becker’s Quantity & Quality model. An exogenous increase in family
size generated by a twin (or other multiple birth) on a later birth makes that parents
21The fact that I cannot find signs of heterogeneity in the sample of children with younger mothers may
also be related to the lower power that I have in this smaller sample.
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rearrange child investment (quality) in the household. In particular, the 2SLS estimates
demonstrate that an increase in number of the children reduces the likelihood that older
children attend private school, increases the likelihood that children share a bedroom,
reduces the mother’s labor force participation, and increases the likelihood that parents
divorce. Although the relationship of these variables with child wellbeing is not always
clear they are under the control of the parents and therefore reflecting their allocation of
resources.
When we go one step further in the causal chain, however, the results do not support
a negative impact of number of children in the family on the group of variables that I think
are closer to child wellbeing such as school grade, teen pregnancy or the probability of
dropping out.
Therefore, the evidence that I find is completely consistent with models of household
production where families facing an exogenous change in family size reallocate different
types of child investment in order to minimize the impact on child wellbeing. In fact
previous evidence that has found a negative impact of family size on child achievements,
mainly in developing countries, can be explained by a lower capacity of some households
in reallocating resources. Thus it is reasonable to think that a trade–off between number
of children and different types of investments is a reality that all household face but a
trade–off between family size and child wellbeing is restricted to those households that
have fewer degrees of freedom to reallocate resources.
Under this evidence, family planning programs that focus the attention only in re-
ducing family size would not necessarily produce an improvement in the child achievements
(wellbeing) if other factors that limit the ability of the household members to reallocate
resources are not solved. In fact, the finding of the paper reveals that we should ensure the
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ability of households to allocate resources more than give a blind financial aid. However
the following step that is defining the potential factors that limit the ability of families to
minimize a potential negative impact on child wellbeing is the tougher one.
Finally, in this paper I show evidence of omitted variable bias in OLS estimates.
While 2SLS estimates do not reveal any impact on the variables that I relate to child well-
being, OLS estimates support a trade–off between number of children and child wellbeing.
In addition, for the group of variables that I link to child investment, OLS estimates either
over–estimate the impact of family size or provide a counter–intuitive result. For example,
the OLS estimates show that a shift in family size increases the probability of attending
a private school and reduces the probability of getting divorced.
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Type of birth in the population Frequency %
Singletons 2,678,550 98.20
Twins 48,266 1.77
Triples 705 0.03
Quadruples 12 0.00
Quintuples 10 0.00
Total 2,727,543 100.00
Table 2.1: Multiple Births Frequency.
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All Two or more siblings Three or more siblings
Age 10.78 11.65 13.21
(5.69) (4.86) (4.06)
Mother’s Age 36.08 35.47 36.22
(9.03) (7.24) (6.34)
Father’s Age 38.82 38.09 39.00
(9.82) (8.09) (7.30)
Years of Education of the mother 12.21 12.19 11.80
(2.52) (2.52) (2.59)
Years of Education of the father 12.73 12.82 12.46
(3.22) (3.25) (3.38)
Number of Siblings 1.88 2.57 3.47
(1.02) (0.88) (0.83)
White 0.80 0.81 0.76
Black 0.10 0.09 0.11
Asian 0.02 0.02 0.02
Hispanic 0.08 0.08 0.11
Multiple births at second pregnancy 0.005 0.009 0.024
Multiple births at third pregnancy 0.002 0.004 0.010
Multiple births 0.008 0.015 0.038
Mother in Home 0.89 1.00 1.00
Father in Home 0.82 0.86 0.86
Attend Private School? 0.14 0.14 0.12
In nursery school? 0.27 0.41 0.49
Migrate? 0.23 0.23 0.21
Share Bedroom? 0.14 0.19 0.38
Mother’s works? 0.56 0.53 0.48
Mother’s Hours at work? 31.51 30.88 30.28
(15.19) (15.37) (15.86)
Parents divorced? 0.25 0.23 0.23
Behind Cohort? 0.12 0.12 0.16
Highest Completed Grade 8.01 7.89 8.15
(2.10) (2.09) (2.11)
Enrolled in School? 0.80 0.83 0.81
Teen Mother? 0.07 0.03 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses. The standard error for proportions is not presented.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics. Data consists of oldest children in the household. Com-
plete Sample.
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Two or more siblings Three or more siblings
Age 7.07 8.73
(3.30) (3.02)
Mother’s Age 28.21 28.91
(3.12) (2.76)
Father’s Age 31.05 32.00
(4.63) (4.59)
Years of Education of the mother 12.06 11.53
(2.23) (2.32)
Years of Education of the father 12.72 12.23
(2.85) (2.99)
Number of Siblings 2.40 3.32
(0.70) (0.66)
White 0.81 0.75
Black 0.075 0.10
Asian 0.01 0.01
Hispanic 0.09 0.13
Multiple births at second pregnancy 0.008 0.028
Multiple births at third pregnancy 0.003 0.009
Multiple births 0.012 0.040
Mother in Home 1.00 1.00
Father in Home 0.88 0.87
Attend Private School? 0.17 0.12
In nursery school? 0.39 0.48
Migrate? 0.30 0.29
Share Bedroom? 0.17 0.41
Mother’s works? 0.45 0.38
Mother’s Hours at work? 29.46 28.58
(16.01) (16.78)
Parents divorced? 0.22 0.24
Behind Cohort? 0.01 0.03
Highest Completed Grade 6.10 6.16
(0.46) (0.57)
Enrolled in School? 0.88 0.86
Teen Mother? 0.02 0.03
Standard errors in parentheses. The standard error for proportions is not presented.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics. Data consists of oldest children in the household. Young
Mothers.
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Old Mothers
Two or more siblings Three or more siblings
Age 14.28 14.99
(3.46) (2.87)
Mother’s Age 39.65 39.13
(5.41) (4.85)
Father’s Age 42.27 41.84
(6.69) (6.19)
Years of Education of the mother 12.26 11.91
(2.67) (2.68)
Years of Education of the father 12.88 12.55
(3.47) (3.53)
Number of Siblings 2.66 3.53
(0.96) (0.89)
White 0.81 0.76
Black 0.09 0.11
Asian 0.02 0.02
Hispanic 0.07 0.10
Multiple births at second pregnancy 0.010 0.023
Multiple births at third pregnancy 0.004 0.010
Multiple births 0.016 0.038
Mother in Home 1.00 1.00
Father in Home 0.85 0.86
Attend Private School? 0.12 0.12
In nursery school? 0.61 0.66
Migrate? 0.18 0.18
Share Bedroom? 0.19 0.37
Mother’s works? 0.57 0.52
Mother’s Hours at work? 31.53 30.77
(15.02) (15.55)
Parents divorced? 0.24 0.23
Behind Cohort? 0.18 0.22
Highest Completed Grade 8.56 8.82
(2.07) (2.01)
Enrolled in School? 0.83 0.81
Teen Mother? 0.03 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses. The standard error for proportions is not presented.
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics. Data consists of oldest children in the household. Older
Mothers.
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Two or more siblings Three or more siblings
Age -0.162 -0.176
(0.058)** (0.076)*
Mother’s Age -0.757 -0.435
(0.086)** (0.119)**
Father’s Age -0.637 -0.445
(0.105)** (0.148)**
Years of Education of the mother -0.022 0.175
(0.030) (0.048)**
Years of Education of the father 0.012 0.220
(0.042) (0.069)**
Number of Siblings -0.838 -0.893
(0.010)** (0.016)**
White 0.015 0.054
(0.005)** (0.008)**
Black -0.027 -0.045
(0.003)** (0.006)**
Asian 0.006 0.004
(0.002)** (0.003)
Hispanic 0.006 -0.015
(0.003) (0.006)**
Standard errors in round parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2.5: Means differences between children that do not have twin siblings and whom
do it.
Younger Mothers Older Mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uncond. Cond. (a) Uncond. Cond. (a) Uncond. Cond. (a)
MB 2 0.838 0.840 0.875 0.876 0.806 0.823
(0.010)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.012)** (0.014)** (0.012)**
N. Observ. 757,769 757,769 277,084 277,084 480,685 480,685
R2 0.15 0.18 0.12
MB 3 0.875 0.854 0.899 0.888 0.861 0.841
(0.016)** (0.013)** (0.024)** (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.017)**
N. Observ. 285,175 285,175 80,842 80,842 204,333 204,333
R2 0.11 0.13 0.09
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
(a) Covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters), state, education of the parents, race,
mothers age and sex.
Table 2.6: Impact of Multiple Births on Number of Children at Home.
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Outcomes Sample and Ages OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School? 6-18 0.0139 -0.0102 {25.60}
(0.0005) ** (0.0048) *
In nursery school? less than 6 -0.0457 -0.0034 {12.01}
(0.0032) ** (0.0126)
Migrate? 0-18 0.0067 -0.0065 {2.71}
(0.0008) ** (0.0081)
Share Bedroom? 0-18 0.2285 0.2011 {22.94}
(0.0008) ** (0.0079) **
Mother’s works? 0-18 -0.0859 -0.0363 {54.09}
(0.0007) ** (0.0068) **
Mother’s Hours at work? 0-18 (a) -0.0466 -0.0180 {6.67}
(0.0012) ** (0.0111)
Parents divorced? 0-18 -0.0207 0.0269 {63.40}
(0.0006) ** (0.0060) **
Behind Cohort? 6-18 0.0144 0.0018 {9.31}
(0.0005) ** (0.0042)
Highest Completed Grade 6-18 -0.0034 0.0001 {12.03}
(0.0001) ** (0.0010)
Enrolled in School? 16-18 -0.0094 -0.0153 {0.40}
(0.0008) ** (0.0094)
Teen Mother? 13-18 0.0037 0.0096 {0.81}
(0.0006) ** (0.0066)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.7: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child Input and Output Equations. Sample of
households with two or more children.
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Outcomes Sample and Ages OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School? 6-18 0.0161 -0.0043 {8.45}
(0.0008) ** (0.0070)
In nursery school? less than 6 -0.0356 0.0064 {1.51}
(0.0115) ** (0.0360)
Migrate? 0-18 0.0055 0.0075 {0.02}
(0.0012) ** (0.0125)
Share Bedroom? 0-18 0.2541 0.3508 {96.86}
(0.0012) ** (0.0099) **
Mother’s works? 0-18 -0.0718 -0.0421 {8.15}
(0.0011) ** (0.0105) **
Mother’s Hours at work? 0-18 (a) -0.0305 -0.0123 {1.03}
(0.0022) ** (0.0181)
Parents divorced? 0-18 -0.0166 0.0121 {9.55}
(0.0009) ** (0.0093)
Behind Cohort? 6-18 0.0191 0.0112 {1.07}
(0.0009) ** (0.0077)
Highest Completed Grade 6-18 -0.0049 -0.0012 {4.76}
(0.0002) ** (0.0017)
Enrolled in School? 16-18 -0.0124 -0.0035 {0.47}
(0.0012) ** (0.0131)
Teen Mother? 13-18 0.0028 0.0097 {0.45}
(0.0010) ** (0.0104)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.8: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child Input and Output Equations. Sample of
households with three or more children.
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Outcomes Sample and Ages OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School? 6-18 0.0116 -0.0059 {4.06}
(0.0010) ** (0.0087)
In nursery school? less than 6 -0.0440 -0.0015 {10.60}
(0.0034) ** (0.0135)
Migrate? 0-18 0.0116 -0.0233 {5.43}
(0.0018) ** (0.0151)
Share Bedroom? 0-18 0.2640 0.2148 {25.41}
(0.0011) ** (0.0098) **
Mother’s works? 0-18 -0.1256 -0.0733 {23.01}
(0.0014) ** (0.0110) **
Mother’s Hours at work? 0-18 (a) -0.0647 -0.0476 {0.62}
(0.0030) ** (0.0220) *
Parents divorced? 0-18 -0.0284 0.0101 {16.58}
(0.0012) ** (0.0095)
Behind Cohort? 6-18 0.0050 -0.0033 {19.20}
(0.0005) ** (0.0019)
Highest Completed Grade 6-18 -0.0010 0.0011 {12.79}
(0.0001) ** (0.0006)
Enrolled in School? 16-18 -0.0095 -0.1955 {0.57}
(0.0091) (0.2466)
Teen Mother? 13-18 -0.0001 -0.0062 {0.27}
(0.0033) (0.0122)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.9: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child Input and Output Equations. Sample of
households with two or more children. Younger Mothers.
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Outcomes Sample and Ages OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School? 6-18 0.0176 0.0290 {0.65}
(0.0017) ** (0.0143) *
In nursery school? less than 6 -0.0320 0.0063 {1.10}
(0.0120) ** (0.0383)
Migrate? 0-18 0.0105 0.0384 {0.41}
(0.0034) ** (0.0261)
Share Bedroom? 0-18 0.3026 0.4338 {57.44}
(0.0028) ** (0.0175) **
Mother’s works? 0-18 -0.0897 -0.0662 {1.70}
(0.0025) ** (0.0182) **
Mother’s Hours at work? 0-18 (a) -0.0389 -0.0080 {0.64}
(0.0065) ** (0.0392)
Parents divorced? 0-18 -0.0185 0.0191 {4.62}
(0.0024) ** (0.0176)
Behind Cohort? 6-18 0.0094 0.0113 {0.09}
(0.0013) ** (0.0066)
Highest Completed Grade 6-18 -0.0019 -0.0008 {0.57}
(0.0003) ** (0.0015)
Enrolled in School? 16-18 -0.0016 0.0636 {0.26}
(0.0140) (0.1276)
Teen Mother? 13-18 -0.0021 -0.0296 {1.83}
(0.0046) (0.0209)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.10: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child Input and Output Equations. Sample of
households with three or more children. Younger Mothers.
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Outcomes Sample and Ages OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School? 6-18 0.0145 -0.0121 {22.03}
(0.0005) ** (0.0057) *
In nursery school? less than 6 -0.0645 -0.0262 {1.30}
(0.0109) ** (0.0353)
Migrate? 0-18 0.0050 0.0026 {0.07}
(0.0008) ** (0.0094)
Share Bedroom? 0-18 0.2168 0.1962 {8.58}
(0.0006) ** (0.0071) **
Mother’s works? 0-18 -0.0742 -0.0170 {45.25}
(0.0008) ** (0.0085) *
Mother’s Hours at work? 0-18 (a) -0.0427 -0.0072 {7.68}
(0.0013) ** (0.0129)
Parents divorced? 0-18 -0.0193 0.0356 {51.78}
(0.0007) ** (0.0077) **
Behind Cohort? 6-18 0.0162 0.0055 {3.05}
(0.0006) ** (0.0062)
Highest Completed Grade 6-18 -0.0040 -0.0004 {7.85}
(0.0001) ** (0.0013)
Enrolled in School? 16-18 -0.0093 -0.0152 {0.41}
(0.0008) ** (0.0094)
Teen Mother? 13-18 0.0038 0.0096 {0.77}
(0.0006) ** (0.0067)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.11: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child Input and Output Equations. Sample of
households with two or more children. Older Mothers.
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Outcomes Sample and Ages OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School? 6-18 0.0156 -0.0175 {17.05}
(0.0009) ** (0.0081) *
In nursery school? less than 6 -0.0861 0.0388 {1.31}
(0.0456) * (0.1184)
Migrate? 0-18 0.0041 -0.0048 {0.41}
(0.0013) ** (0.0139)
Share Bedroom? 0-18 0.2440 0.3184 {40.03}
(0.0013) ** (0.0118) **
Mother’s works? 0-18 -0.0677 -0.0333 {7.41}
(0.0012) ** (0.0127) **
Mother’s Hours at work? 0-18 (a) -0.0289 -0.0123 {0.68}
(0.0024) ** (0.0203)
Parents divorced? 0-18 -0.0169 0.0096 {5.86}
(0.0010) ** (0.0110)
Behind Cohort? 6-18 0.0199 0.0101 {0.93}
(0.0011) ** (0.0102)
Highest Completed Grade 6-18 -0.0053 -0.0012 {3.38}
(0.0003) ** (0.0022)
Enrolled in School? 16-18 -0.0124 -0.0035 {0.46}
(0.0012) ** (0.0131)
Teen Mother? 13-18 0.0030 0.0101 {0.45}
(0.0010) ** (0.0106)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.12: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child Input and Output Equations. Sample of
households with three or more children. Older Mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School?
White 0.0216 -0.0109 {35.66}
(0.0006) ** (0.0055) *
Non-White -0.0049 -0.0059 {0.01}
(0.0007) ** (0.0095)
Male 0.0144 -0.0148 {19.62}
(0.0007) ** (0.0066) *
Female 0.0133 -0.0055 {7.49}
(0.0007) ** (0.0069)
Mother’s works?
White -0.0929 -0.0314 {65.92}
(0.0008) ** (0.0076) **
Non-White -0.0665 -0.0548 {0.65}
(0.0012) ** (0.0146) **
Male -0.0863 -0.0454 {19.06}
(0.0009) ** (0.0094) **
Female -0.0855 -0.0265 {36.93}
(0.0010) ** (0.0098) **
Parents divorced?
White -0.0211 0.0230 {45.43}
(0.0007) ** (0.0066) **
Non-White -0.0159 0.0417 {16.47}
(0.0011) ** (0.0142) **
Male -0.0187 0.0253 {28.47}
(0.0008) ** (0.0083) **
Female -0.0228 0.0289 {35.36}
(0.0008) ** (0.0087) **
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.13: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Inputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with two or more children. All
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Behind Cohort?
White 0.0103 0.0007 {4.64}
(0.0006) ** (0.0045)
Non-White 0.0206 0.0088 {1.36}
(0.0010) ** (0.0102)
Male 0.0143 0.0043 {2.70}
(0.0007) ** (0.0061)
Female 0.0145 0.0004 {6.49}
(0.0007) ** (0.0056)
Highest Completed Grade
White -0.0024 0.0008 {10.26}
(0.0001) ** (0.0010)
Non-White -0.0051 -0.0032 {0.53}
(0.0003) ** (0.0026)
Male -0.0033 -0.0003 {4.01}
(0.0002) ** (0.0015)
Female -0.0034 0.0002 {8.13}
(0.0002) ** (0.0013)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
Table 2.14: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Outputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with two or more children. All
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School?
White 0.0247 -0.0033 {10.42}
(0.0011) ** (0.0087)
Non-White -0.0014 -0.0040 {0.06}
(0.0009) (0.0108)
Male 0.0165 -0.0212 {17.29}
(0.0011) (0.0091) *
Female 0.0156 0.0132 {0.05}
(0.0011) ** (0.0108)
Mother’s works?
White -0.0774 -0.0488 {5.44}
(0.0014) ** (0.0123) **
Non-White -0.0610 -0.0275 {2.96}
(0.0018) ** (0.0195)
Male -0.0737 -0.0507 {2.58}
(0.0015) ** (0.0144) **
Female -0.0697 -0.0335 {5.73}
(0.0016) ** (0.0152) *
Parents divorced?
White -0.0161 0.0094 {5.83}
(0.0011) ** (0.0106)
Non-White -0.0126 0.0151 {2.23}
(0.0017) ** (0.0186)
Male -0.0147 0.0075 {2.95}
(0.0013) ** (0.0130)
Female -0.0186 0.0171 {7.14}
(0.0014) ** (0.0134)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.15: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Inputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with three or more children. All
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Behind Cohort?
White 0.0148 0.0154 {0.00}
(0.0011) ** (0.0087)
Non-White 0.0241 0.0024 {2.01}
(0.0017) ** (0.0154)
Male 0.0179 0.0144 {0.10}
(0.0013) ** (0.0113)
Female 0.0205 0.0065 {1.94}
(0.0013) ** (0.0102)
Highest Completed Grade
White -0.0037 -0.0017 {1.31}
(0.0002) ** (0.0018)
Non-White -0.0064 0.0000 {2.71}
(0.0004) ** (0.0039)
Male -0.0046 0.0011 {5.43}
(0.0003) ** (0.0025)
Female -0.0052 -0.0033 {0.68}
(0.0003) ** (0.0023)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
Table 2.16: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Outputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with three or more children. All
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School?
White 0.0190 -0.0080 {7.77}
(0.0012) ** (0.0098)
Non-White -0.0084 -0.0003 {0.19}
(0.0014) ** (0.0187)
Male 0.0121 -0.0036 {1.70}
(0.0013) ** (0.0121)
Female 0.0111 -0.0082 {2.39}
(0.0014) ** (0.0125)
Mother’s works?
White -0.1345 -0.0818 {19.11}
(0.0016) ** (0.0122) **
Non-White -0.1018 -0.0380 {6.32}
(0.0026) ** (0.0255)
Male -0.1252 -0.0758 {10.95}
(0.0019) ** (0.0150) **
Female -0.1261 -0.0707 {12.00}
(0.0019) ** (0.0161) **
Parents divorced?
White -0.0295 0.0018 {9.46}
(0.0014) ** (0.0103)
Non-White -0.0226 0.0403 {7.22}
(0.0024) ** (0.0235)
Male -0.0263 0.0046 {5.75}
(0.0017) ** (0.0130)
Female -0.0306 0.0166 {11.51}
(0.0018) ** (0.0140)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.17: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Inputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with two or more children. Younger
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Behind Cohort?
White 0.0035 -0.0016 {6.46}
(0.0005) ** (0.0021)
Non-White 0.0064 -0.0092 {9.06}
(0.0011) ** (0.0053)
Male 0.0050 -0.0026 {8.10}
(0.0007) ** (0.0028)
Female 0.0050 -0.0033 {10.63}
(0.0007) ** (0.0027)
Highest Completed Grade
White -0.0008 0.0003 {3.47}
(0.0001) ** (0.0006)
Non-White -0.0015 0.0037 {9.08}
(0.0003) ** (0.0017) *
Male -0.0010 0.0011 {5.32}
(0.0002) ** (0.0009)
Female -0.0011 0.0008 {7.02}
(0.0002) ** (0.0007)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
Table 2.18: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Outputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with two or more children. Younger
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School?
White 0.0291 0.0534 {1.69}
(0.0025) ** (0.0189) **
Non-White -0.0041 -0.0238 {1.30}
(0.0019) * (0.0174)
Male 0.0168 0.0139 {0.02}
(0.0024) ** (0.0189)
Female 0.0183 0.0429 {1.35}
(0.0024) ** (0.0213) *
Mother’s works?
White -0.0930 -0.0711 {1.05}
(0.0032) ** (0.0216) **
Non-White -0.0844 -0.0523 {0.95}
(0.0042) ** (0.0332)
Male -0.0883 -0.0774 {0.19}
(0.0036) ** (0.0250) **
Female -0.0908 -0.0562 {1.73}
(0.0036) ** (0.0266) *
Parents divorced?
White -0.0185 0.0235 {4.16}
(0.0030) ** (0.0208)
Non-White -0.0131 0.0070 {0.39}
(0.0040) ** (0.0326)
Male -0.0179 0.0154 {1.90}
(0.0034) ** (0.0244)
Female -0.0194 0.0226 {2.79}
(0.0035) ** (0.0254)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.19: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Inputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with three or more children. Younger
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Behind Cohort?
White 0.0062 0.0084 {0.09}
(0.0015) ** (0.0077)
Non-White 0.0116 0.0203 {0.53}
(0.0023) ** (0.0121)
Male 0.0092 0.0021 {0.65}
(0.0018) ** (0.0089)
Female 0.0099 0.0202 {1.18}
(0.0018) ** (0.0097) *
Highest Completed Grade
White -0.0012 -0.0004 {0.22}
(0.0003) ** (0.0018)
Non-White -0.0027 -0.0020 {0.06}
(0.0006) ** (0.0028)
Male -0.0020 0.0013 {2.16}
(0.0004) ** (0.0023)
Female -0.0019 -0.0034 {0.61}
(0.0004) ** (0.0020)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
Table 2.20: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Outputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with three or more children. Younger
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School?
White 0.0224 -0.0126 {28.36}
(0.0007) ** (0.0066)
Non-White -0.0040 -0.0087 {0.19}
(0.0008) ** (0.0108)
Male 0.0151 -0.0198 {19.73}
(0.0008) ** (0.0079) *
Female 0.0140 -0.0046 {5.12}
(0.0008) ** (0.0082)
Mother’s works?
White -0.0812 -0.0045 {62.82}
(0.0009) ** (0.0097)
Non-White -0.0559 -0.0620 {0.12}
(0.0014) ** (0.0177) **
Male -0.0750 -0.0291 {14.85}
(0.0011) ** (0.0120) *
Female -0.0733 -0.0040 {32.45}
(0.0011) ** (0.0122)
Parents divorced?
White -0.0190 0.0337 {39.31}
(0.0007) ** (0.0084) **
Non-White -0.0154 0.0434 {10.99}
(0.0013) ** (0.0178) *
Male -0.0173 0.0370 {26.37}
(0.0009) ** (0.0106) **
Female -0.0214 0.0342 {25.38}
(0.0009) ** (0.0111) **
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.21: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Inputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with two or more children. older
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Behind Cohort?
White 0.0127 0.0013 {2.88}
(0.0007) ** (0.0067)
Non-White 0.0234 0.0226 {0.00}
(0.0013) ** (0.0148)
Male 0.0161 0.0081 {0.76}
(0.0009) ** (0.0092)
Female 0.0163 0.0030 {2.65}
(0.0009) ** (0.0083)
Highest Completed Grade
White -0.0030 0.0011 {9.25}
(0.0002) ** (0.0013)
Non-White -0.0060 -0.0060 {0.00}
(0.0003) ** (0.0035)
Male -0.0039 -0.0008 {2.61}
(0.0002) ** (0.0020)
Female -0.0040 -0.0001 {5.61}
(0.0002) ** (0.0016)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
Table 2.22: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Outputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with two or more children. older
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Attend Private School?
White 0.0237 -0.0244 {24.82}
(0.0012) ** (0.0097) *
Non-White -0.0008 0.0051 {0.19}
(0.0011) (0.0137)
Male 0.0163 -0.0350 {25.05}
(0.0013) ** (0.0103) **
Female 0.0149 0.0010 {1.25}
(0.0013) ** (0.0125)
Mother’s works?
White -0.0743 -0.0407 {5.16}
(0.0015) ** (0.0149) **
Non-White -0.0553 -0.0152 {2.78}
(0.0020) ** (0.0241)
Male -0.0705 -0.0415 {2.78}
(0.0017) ** (0.0175) *
Female -0.0647 -0.0256 {4.54}
(0.0018) ** (0.0184)
Parents divorced?
White -0.0158 0.0045 {2.74}
(0.0012) ** (0.0123)
Non-White -0.0134 0.0186 {2.01}
(0.0019) ** (0.0227)
Male -0.0146 0.0049 {1.64}
(0.0014) ** (0.0153)
Female -0.0193 0.0141 {4.48}
(0.0015) ** (0.0159)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
(a) The sample is additionally constrained to working mothers.
Table 2.23: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Inputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with three or more children. Older
mothers.
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Outcomes OLS 2SLS
Behind Cohort?
White 0.0166 0.0166 {0.00}
(0.0013) ** (0.0115)
Non-White 0.0255 -0.0081 {2.49}
(0.0020) ** (0.0214)
Male 0.0187 0.0180 {0.00}
(0.0015) ** (0.0152)
Female 0.0214 -0.0006 {2.62}
(0.0015) ** (0.0136)
Highest Completed Grade
White -0.0042 -0.0022 {0.76}
(0.0003) ** (0.0023)
Non-White -0.0070 0.0013 {2.58}
(0.0005) ** (0.0052)
Male -0.0050 0.0007 {3.19}
(0.0004) ** (0.0032)
Female -0.0056 -0.0031 {0.72}
(0.0004) ** (0.0030)
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Parameters Estimates (Standard Errors) and {Hausman Test Statistic}.
The Hausman test statistic is for the null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS are identical.
The test is distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom and 95% critical value
of 3.84. Others covariates in the model are dummies by age (measured in quarters),
state of residence, education of the parents, race, parents age and sex.
Table 2.24: Heterogeneity by sex and race. Outputs. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Child
Input and Output Equations. Sample of households with three or more children. Older
mothers.
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Chapter 3
Female Labor Participation and its role on Obesity
3.1 Overview
Obesity has reached epidemic levels (Mokdad et al., 1999), making it a vital public
health issue.1 Among adults between ages 20 and 74 the prevalence of obesity has risen
from 13.4% to 30.9% between 1960 and 2000. Children have not been excluded from this
trend. In 2000, more than 15% of children aged 6 to 11 were obese. This percentage has
tripled since 1964. Despite the fact that the increase in obesity is a phenomenon spanning
all ages, races and both genders, minority groups have had a particulary rapid rise in
obesity rates during the last decade. Overall, the obesity rate has increased approximately
5 percentage points between the periods 1988-94 and 1999-2000; for Blacks and Mexican
Americans the increase was approximately 10 percentage points. In addition, for the
period 1999-2000 the obesity rate among Black adults is higher than among whites. This
is driven by the obesity rate of Black women.
This increase in obesity is particularly puzzling if we consider the evidence that
shows only a modest gain in calorie consumption2 (Lakdawalla and Philipson, pp. 2,
1Part of this public awareness comes first from the potential link between obesity and several disorders
such as type II diabetes, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, stroke, heart disease, arthritis and some types
of cancer (endometrial, breast, prostate and colon). Some estimates reveal the cost of caring for people
with entirely preventable obesity-related illness tops 70 billion per year, about half of which is paid by the
government. Second, there is a strong lobby pushing for a re–classification of obesity as a disease and not
only as a risk factor. In fact this re–classification of obesity might have a negative effect making health
insurance unaffordable for many people.
2On the other hand, Cutler et al. (2003) show that a modest increase in the consumption of calories
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2002) and the fitness mania that we face every day.
Obesity is a problem that is related to the imbalance between dietary intake and
energy expenditure. Unlike many other health conditions, in the majority of cases obesity
can be affected by behavioral change.3 Weight is a state variable whose change over
time results from a difference between calories consumed and calories burned. Under
this framework one of the main explanations given for the increase in the proportion of
obesity is technological change (Philipson and Posner, 1999; Lakdawalla and Philipson,
2002, Cutler et al., 2003)4. They argue that there has been a reduction in the real cost
of calories while energy requirements have fallen. The problem with arguments based
completely on technological change is that it is unlikely to explain the rapid rise in obesity
that we have observed in recent decades.5 A technological change also cannot account for
is enough to explain the change in the steady-state weight. In particular as they reported, the 10 to 12
pound increase in the median weight observed in the last twenty years requires only a net caloric imbalance
of about 100 to 150 calories per day, an amount that they described as the amount of calories contained
in three Oreo cookies or one can of Pepsi.
3This idea that most cases of obesity can be affected by behavioral change is one of the arguments that
is given against the classification of obesity as a disease. Individuals that defend the disease classification
argue that there is increasing evidence that relates some of the traditional diseases (for example some
types of cancer) to specific risk behaviors. However, when this paper refers to obesity as a disease, it is
not intended to defend a particular position.
4Technological change has been the preferred explanation because it is consistent not only with the
rise in the incidence of obesity but also with the more or less stable overall consumption of calories in the
population.
5Technological change seems a valid explanation for the log–term evolution of obesity among the pop-
ulation. In agricultural or industrial societies, work is energy consumption intensive and welfare systems
are ungenerous. Technological change has freed up time from producing food, enabling a reallocation of
time to other activities such as producing services. Therefore in a developed society work entails a lower
consumption of energy and not engaging in production activities does not necessarily imply starvation.
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the higher increase that we observe among minorities and other low income groups.
Household production might provide an additional explanation for the rapid rise in
obesity – an increase in female labor force participation raises the cost of time intensive
activities and induces a substitution into activities that are less time intensive but more
goods intensive. In this context a rise in female labor force participation would induce a
substitution out of home cooked meals into fast food and other types of prepared meals.
This chapter suggests the rise in the cost of women’s time coupled with a low level of
non–labor income (tight budget constraint) might be behind the higher incidence of obe-
sity observed in low income groups and minorities. It is important to stress that the
impact of female labor force participation on obesity and on body weight in general is
not straightforward. In order for it to increase obesity, we would expect mother’s labor
force participation to reduce the relative cost of eating out, and her earnings would be
insufficient to afford less calorie intensive meals out. Less calorie intensive meals at home
have a high cost in time. One potential equilibrium is reached with low-cost (time and
price), calorie-intensive meals out. However, if resources generated in the labor market
are sufficient to compensate for the rise in the cost of time, a second potential equilib-
rium is reached, less calorie intensive meals out. Additionally, the rise in women’s time
out the home can impact the weight of other household members. For example, working
mothers might spend less time with their children who might spend more time in front of
the TV or video games, factors that have been linked to higher gains in Body Mass Index
(BMI)(Berkey et al., 2000). Also working women are more likely to send their children to
daycare or nursery schools, whose impact on nutritional behavior is not at all clear.
In this chapter, I study the impact of female labor participation on the body weight
of women and their husbands. I also examine direct inputs into body weight – the level of
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physical activity and nutrient intake. An analysis of married men allows us to investigate
the impact of female labor force participation on other members in the household, (e.g.
children), avoiding a genetic explanation. Using the National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) I found that female employment has a positive impact on Body Mass Index (BMI)
for married men with less than a high school education. However I did not find an impact
for all samples of women or men with high school or more. This finding is consistent
with men facing an increase in the cost of home cooking with a positive impact on body
weight. Women face an offsetting rise in the level of physical activity and households
whose husbands have higher income can afford less calorie–intensive prepared food. The
magnitude of these findings is larger than found elsewhere in the literature. This is
primarily because I take account of the endogeneity of female labor force participation.
The analysis from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey reveals
that married men with less than a high school education, or married men with a college
degree or more, face an increase in their BMI and the likelihood of being obese if they live
in states with a positive shock in female labor demand. The results also show that for
married men with higher levels of education female demand shocks produce an increase
in the levels of physical activity. This last element, plus the positive impact of female
demand shocks on BMI and obesity rate, suggests that the channel through which female
labor force participation raises a man’s weight must be through a higher consumption of
calories which is consistent with a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables that we find
associated with female demand shocks for this group.
The rest of chapter 3 is organized as follows. The second section presents the
literature review. Section three describe a simple household production model to formalize
our hypothesis. Section four explains the empirical methodology used to address the
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problem of identification. The fifth section describes how the variables and samples have
been constructed and provides a descriptive analysis of the variables. Section six presents
the results and section seven, the conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
Some limited evidence exists of a positive effect of labor force participation on the
rate of obesity. Chou, Grossman and Saffer (2002) use micro-level data from the 1984-1999
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System in order to study factors behind the rise of
obesity. Among other variables6, they analyze the impact of hours worked per week and
hourly wage rates on body weight.7 They find that wages and hours of work have a positive
impact on body mass index and on the probability of being obese. They estimate that
the elasticity of BMI with respect to wages is 0.03 and the elasticity of BMI with respect
to hours is 0.04. When the probability of being obese is considered, these elasticities are
0.32 and 0.19, respectively.
The role of female employment has been studied in relation to its impact on child
weight problems. Takahashi et al. (1999) find a positive relationship in a sample of
Japanese children. For the US., Johnson et al. (1992) find no significant effect of maternal
employment on nutrient intake in a sample of U.S. children ages 2 to 5. In other study
6Other variables in their analysis are per capita number of fast food restaurants, per capita full–service
restaurants, the price of a meal in each type of restaurant, the price of food consumed at home, the price
of cigarettes and clean indoor air laws.
7This information is extracted from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The assignment is based
on 64 cells that are defined in terms of gender, race, marital status, and years of formal schooling. Hours
worked is defined as the usual hours worked per week per in one of 64 cells in a given state and year
multiplied by the employment rate in that cell. In the same way, hourly wage is defined as the average
hourly wage rate in each of the cells multiplied by the employment rate in each cell.
67
of American children, Anderson et al. (2002) find that an increase in 10 hours per week
in maternal employment increases the likelihood that a child is overweight by 0.5 to 1.0
percentage points depending on the specification and identification strategy.
The evidence about the impact of female labor force participation on the incidence
of childhood obesity seems especially important given the stronger work requirements that
have been progressively introduced by welfare reform in the U.S. during the 1990’s. The
assumption behind these tougher work incentives is that individuals will be more motivated
to find a job, and will become independent of welfare. In fact, much of the evidence
reveals that more individuals are working under the new welfare schemes. However, many
policymakers and observers are concerned about the potentially harmful consequences of
the new welfare system. In particular the evidence collected from Connecticut’s reformed
welfare system shows that mothers mothers are increasingly working, but there has not
been a significant increase in their income. Also many of these newly working mothers are
engaged in irregular work hours and in more than one job, which might be directly linked
to obesity. Mothers have less time to cook or to supervise children’s activities because
they are working. However, the income generated is not sufficient which, in turn, increases
the likelihood of consumption of fast food.
Some research has specifically studied the relationship between welfare programs
and childhood obesity. The results are mixed depending on the outcomes and welfare
program considered. Hofferd and Curtin (2003) find no evidence that programs such as
the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch Program contribute to obesity
among poor children. Haider et al. (2003) compare the change in the breastfeeding rate
in states that adopted stringent work policies versus states that had lenient policies. The
results show a greater drop in the breastfeeding rate after a child is six months old for new
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mothers enrolled in the Special Supplemental Program for Women (3.1 percent), versus a
drop of 2.1 percent for all mothers.
3.3 Why Does female labor participation matter?
In order to formalize my hypothesis about the impact of female labor participation
on adult obesity I use a simplified version of a static household production model. I
assume that people prefer to feel full and therefore the amount or volume of food, V,
enters positively in the utility function. While people like to feel full, within the range
of calories typically consumed in a developed country, net calories, C, enter negatively
into the utility function. A key problem is that large volumes of food typically entail
large calorie intake, although as I explain below, agents can take costly actions to reduce
calorie intake per unit of volume. As usual leisure, l, and the consumption of other goods,
X, enter positively into the utility function. In particular the utility function takes the
following form:
U(X,V,C, l) = α0log(X) + α1log(V ) + α2C
2 + α3log(l) (3.1)
with α0, α1, α3 > 0, and α2 < 0. (3.2)
Therefore utility does not rise in the consumption of calories but instead rises from
the volume of food intake. What this tries to capture in simplified fashion is the biological
fact that the brain perceives the fullness of the stomach rather than net calories and
this triggers the impulse to stop eating (CITE). The assumption that net calories enter
negatively in the utility function represents the fact that the analysis done in this chapter
starts from a steady state in body weight. In the context of the Lakdawalla and Philipson
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dynamic model, individuals in this model live only one period and they start this period
with an “ideal” weight. Thus any level of calories that is either over or under the level
of calories, C, needed to keep that ideal weight will produce a reduction in the level of
utility.
The volume of food is produced with a Cobb–Douglas technology,
V = V β1x t
(1−β1)
1 0 < β1 < 1, (3.3)
with t1 representing the time allocated to produce a particular volume of food and Vx
standing for any other input required. While home prepared food would require a more
time intensive combination of inputs, eating prepared food would be an option more inten-
sive in Vx. We could see Vx as a vector of inputs with different qualities, where its impact
on total calories as well as the source of theses calories accounting for these differences
among inputs8. In order to keep the presentation simple I assume that Vx represents an
unique input and I abstract from differences in calories among inputs.
Individuals also select the average level of calories per unit of volume of food that
is represented as
8In fast–food restaurants a higher proportion of the calories come from fat. A fat calorie is heavier
than a protein or carbohydrate calorie. Calories from fat are more fattening than calories from proteins or
carbohydrates. Our bodies tend to store excess calories from fat as fat more readily than they do excess
calories from carbohydrates or proteins. Not only does the body store fat calories more easily, it also burns
them less readily. The body, plotting to protect itself from starvation, will use up carbohydrate stores for
energy before dipping into the fat reserves. The body must use more energy (or calories) to metabolize
carbohydrates and proteins than it uses to burn fats. Fatty foods tend to pack more calories into a smaller
volume than do carbohydrate and protein foods.
70
c = θ0 +
θ1
(1 + θ2 ∗ t2)
θ0, θ1, θ2 > 0, (3.4)
where t2 represents the time allocated in reduction of average calories. Time can be
used to reduce calories in several ways. Raw foods (salad, vegetables) are often lower in
calories but may take more attention to make tasty than more highly processed foods.
An alternative is to use time to do research. It takes time to understand how to reduce
calories in cooking.
An individual who does not spend time reducing calories, t2 = 0, has an average
level of calories in home cooking of (θ0 + θ1). In the other extreme if individuals spent
the complete available time reducing calories, the average level of calories would be (θ0 +
θ1
(1+θ2T )
). Then as families allocate more time they can reduce average calories but at a
decreasing rate. Specifically, θ0 represents the amount of calories that can not be reduced,
θ1 the amount suitable to be reduced and θ2 a parameter affecting the marginal impact of
t2 (−
θ1θ2
(1+θ2t2)2
). In this fashion we can define the total time cooking, tck as the sum of the
time engaged in producing the food, t1, and the time spent reducing the average calories,
t2.
Net calories, defined as the difference between calorie intake and calories burned, is
represented as
C = cV − C. (3.5)
C can be seen as the basal level of calories that an individual needs in order to
maintain a specific weight. In fact this basal requirement of calories depends (among
other factors such as weight and age), on the level of physical activity that the individual
carries on. However I left as exogenous C as well as the level of physical activity. In fact,
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we can think of this analysis as the short run version of the Lakdawalla and Philipson
model, where the calories spent are unchanged and exogenous to the individuals.
We observe from expression 3.5 that individuals can reduce net calories in two ways:
a) by reducing the volume of food; and b) by reducing the average amount of calories per
volume. While the cost of reducing calories by reducing the volume of food consumed is
the direct reduction in utility from a lower food consumption, the cost associated with
the second option comes from the reduction in leisure time. In this way we do not need
for individuals to eat more in order to gain weight, some may even eat less. What’s
important, however, is that people who gain weight might not necessarily eat a greater
volume of food, they eat more calories than they burn in a particular period.
Individuals face the usual constraints. The first one,
T − l − tck − twork = 0, (3.6)
represents the constraint of time. The total time available, T , is divided among leisure,
time cooking, tck, and time working, twork. The second constraint is the budget constraint,
w ∗ twork + Inl −X − px ∗ Vx ≥ 0, (3.7)
where w and px are the hourly wage rate and the price of the ingredients in home cooking.
Finally, Inl stands for non–labor income. In our context, where we are studying the impact
associated with female labor force participation, Inl can be seen as husband’s earnings.
The problem for the household can be reduced to selecting the optimum levels of
X, Vx, V1,V2, t1, t2 and twork that maximize 3.3 subject to 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
From the First Order Conditions (FOC) we get the following expressions:
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Vxβ1
(1 + β1)Vt1
=
px
w
, (3.8)
α1Vt1
V
+ 2α2Vt1C(θ0 +
θ1
(1 + θ2 ∗ t2)
) = −2(
θ1θ2α2
(1 + θ2 ∗ t2)2
)V C. (3.9)
Expression 3.8 represents the known rate of substitution among food production
inputs that in the optimum equal the ratio of their shadow prices. From this expression
we see that as wages increase, resulting in the greater cost of time, individuals shift from a
more time intensive way of preparing food, home cooking, to more market input intensive
technology.
Expression 3.9 represents the optimal division of time between food production
(t1) and calorie reduction (t2). Optimally, an individual creates a situation where the
marginal benefit associated with food production (left hand side of the expression) equals
the marginal benefit of allocating time in calorie reduction (right hand side of the expres-
sion). We can see that the marginal benefit in food production falls for three reasons.
First, individuals have a decreasing utility in food consumption. Second, there is de-
creasing returns in time allocated in food production. Finally, as individuals produce and
consume more food they face a loss of utility associated with an increase in net calories,
where this reduction in utility is increasing in the levels of net calories. On the other hand
we can appreciate that the benefit associated with calorie reduction is increasing not only
with the volume of food but also with net calories. However for a fixed volume and level
of net calories the reduction in calories is decreasing with time.
Besides the simple form of the model I don’t obtain an explicit solution. In order to
have a perspective about the implications of the model, I solve it numerically for different
wage and non-labor income levels. The solutions for some of the variables of interest are
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presented in figure 3.1 through figure 3.6.
Figure 3.1 presents the number of hours allocated in the labor market. As hourly
wage increases, individuals spend more time in the labor market but it can be seen that
the wage elasticity is higher for lower income levels. Similarly, for a given wage rate we
see a reduction in the time working as we move up in the income groups and individuals
are able to consume more leisure.
Figure 3.2 shows the total time allocated to cooking, while figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows
its decomposition between food production and calorie reduction, respectively. As non-
labor income rises, keeping wages constant, individuals allocate more time to cooking.
They can only afford more ingredients, and also more time, because they allocate less
hours to the labor market. In fact, as we see in figure 3.5, when non-labor income increases,
individuals increase monotonically their consumption of food, but at a decreasing rate.
This result is driven in part by a simplification in the model by not considering the
existence of a bliss point such that food consumption over that level would produce a
reduction in utility. This higher consumption of food, as non-labor income rises, increases
the marginal utility associated with the allocation of time to calorie reduction as we
can see in figure 3.4 and we already discussed with expression 3.9. When wage rate
increases, individuals spend less time cooking, which is mainly driven by time in food
production. The same regularity is observed for the time allocated in calorie reduction
with the exception of the groups with lower levels of non-labor income where we observe
a mild increase in the time allocated to calorie reduction as wages increase.
Another interesting result is how food consumption is impacted differently by an
increase in wages across different income levels. While for lower income levels an increase
in wages leads to an increase in food consumption, for higher income groups, I find that this
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rise in wages produces a reduction in food consumption. As non-labor income increases,
individuals consume a higher proportion of food which brings down its marginal utility.
Then, given this lower marginal utility for higher income groups, an equal rise in wages
and an increase in the cost of time will drag out more hours of cooking with its consequent
reduction in food consumption.
Finally, figure 3.5 presents the result for the total consumption of calories. As non-
labor income increases individuals monotonically increase their consumption of calories
which is mainly driven by the fact that I have not considered a bliss point in food con-
sumption. Though we observe an increase in calories among all non-labor income groups
as wages increase, we observe a steeper change for groups with lower levels of income.
This flatter calories–wages profile for higher income groups results for two reasons. First,
as we saw in figure 3.5, higher income groups reduce food consumption when they face
an increase in wages. Second, higher income groups are the ones that are able to allocate
more time to calorie reduction.
Therefore the impact of an increase in female labor participation (∆twork > 0)
9 on
the equilibrium body weight will be the result of two competing forces. On the one hand,
an increase in the the time allocated to paid activities will increase the cost of home food
production (and physical activities that I have not modeled). As a result the household not
only spends less time in physical activities but also increases the proportion of food that
comes from the market. Although the rise in income associated with higher wages allows
9It is important to stress that twork is endogenous in the model and in order to understand the overall
impact of an increase in the time allocated to paid activities, we need to understand the sources that are
behind the change. In particular in our model an increase in female labor participation produced by an
increase in wages might have a completely different impact on body weight than an increase in the time
allocated to female labor force participation that is produced by a reduction in non-labor income.
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the household to increase all different sources of food (and food ingredients), for higher
levels of income the proportion of calories might be reduced not only by switching to less
caloric food alternatives but also by spending more time in calorie reduction. However,
which of these two forces dominate is not clear. The lower the non-labor income, the higher
the complementarity between time and ingredients (Vx) in the home food production, and
the higher the cost of less caloric prepared food, the more likely it is that the overall
impact of female labor participation on body weight is positive.
An aspect that has not been considered in the model, but is nonetheless important,
is the composition of time in other activities at home. In particular, the rise in the cost of
a woman’s time has a direct impact on child investment. Some studies using time diaries
reveal that children from households where mothers spend more hours in paid activities,
spend more time watching TV or playing video games, which are two factors that have
been linked to a higher incidence of child obesity.
3.4 The identification problem.
The specific question that I ’d like to address in this chapter is whether or not female
labor force participation has an impact on body weight. One parameter of interest is
E(yi1|th > 0)− E(yi0|th > 0), (3.10)
where y1 represents a potential function of body weight if an individual is assigned a
positive number of hours in the labor market (treated) and y0 if not (non-treated). Em-
pirically, great attention has been given to two measures of weight, the “obesity rate“
and Body Mass Index (BMI). The BMI is defined as the weight in kilograms divided by
the square of height in meters. A BMI between 20 and 22 is considered ideal for adults
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regardless of gender, between 23 and 25 is normal, a BMI over 25 and lower than 30 is
considered overweight and adults that have a BMI over 30 are defined as obese. Although,
BMI and obesity rate have been linked to risk factors, nothing ensures that these two vari-
ables would be sensitive enough to capture the impact of a rise in the opportunity cost of
women’s time in the short run. Departures from an ideal weight result from an imbalance
between calorie intake and calorie use. Ideally we would like to measure the impact of
female labor force participation on calories consumed and calories burned. However, many
times due to data limitations, we only observe the outcome of body weight.
The parameter in expression 3.10 is known in the literature as the Average Treat-
ment Effect on the Treated (ATET), and represents the average impact of the treatment,
a positive number of hours in the labor market, for the population that is treated, i.e those
that in effect engaged in paid activities.
In the context of the model presented in the previous section where y represents the
total consumption of calories, and assuming that all individuals eat the same volume of
food, V, and they can only choose between working a fixed amount of hours or not taking
part at all in the labor market, we get the following expression for the ATET:
E(yi1|th > 0)− E(yi0|th > 0) = E(
V θ1(t
NW
2 (w, Inl)− t
W
2 (w, Inl))
(1 + θ2tNW2 (w, Inl))(1 + θ2t
W
2 (w, Inl))
), (3.11)
where tW2 (w, Inl) and t
NW
2 (w, Inl) represent the optimal allocation of time in reduction of
calories when the individual decided to work or not, respectively.
From expression 3.11 we see that the sign of the ATET is not clear and that it
will depend on the average time allocated in calorie reduction for those that take part in
the labor market. If those that take part in paid activities spend on average less time
in calorie reduction, i.e., a substitution effect dominated to an income effect, the ATET
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would be positive. However the simplicity of this result stresses the importance that the
ATET depends on who the compliers are.
We face a missing data problem trying to get an estimate of expression 3.11. For
those that are taking part in the labor market we do not observe their counterfactual
state, i.e the outcome that they would have if they had not engaged in paid activities. In
fact, the observed outcome can be represented by the following bivariate regression model:
yijt = α0 + α1 ∗ flfpjt + εijt, (3.12)
where yijt represents a specific outcome for individual i, in household j in period t, flfpit
denotes a dummy variable that stands for female labor force participation in household j
in period t (th > 0). For simplicity in the exposition the other covariates are left implicit.
The non-random nature of flfpit and the missing data problem make the OLS esti-
mate of α1 a biased estimate of the true ATET. In fact in terms of our model individuals
will take part in paid activities (flfpit=1) if U(X,V,C, l)
W > U(X,V,C, l)NW . Individ-
uals will take part in the labor market if their costs in term of utility when working with
respect to non–working are lower than their benefits. Among the costs are a reduction in
leisure and a potential increase in total calories, and among the benefits is an increase in
the consumption.
The sign of this bias is not clear and it depends on the source of the heterogeneity
among treated and non–treated. For example, if we assume that those individuals that
engaged in paid activities are the ones with lower cost in term of calorie reduction, or
the ones with higher income effect such that they allocate more time in calorie reduction,
OLS estimates of α1 in equation 3.12 would underestimate the true ATET. More formally
and in general terms the problem that we face is the fact that labor force participation is
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correlated with many other individual characteristics (observed and unobserved) that not
only influence the decision to engage in paid activities but also might simultaneously be
correlated with behaviors that affect body weight (cov(flfpjt, εijt) 6= 0). We would also
underestimate the effect of female labor force participation on weight if more energetic
people also have a high propensity to work. Similarly, individuals with a relative advantage
in the market, the ones more “able”, are the individuals that engaged first in paid activities
and are therefore more likely to generate enough earnings to allow them to afford not
only fast food but other less calorie–intensive alternatives. Also, the participation in the
job market might require some degree of investment in personal care that can be more
costly for those people with weight problems, who facing that cost, would opt to stay at
home. In fact some evidence exists about discrimination against individuals with weight
problems (Averett and Korenman, 1996). Women facing a lower potential wage may
choose to stay at home. As a result of these unobserved factors, in this hypothetical case
traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would underestimate the impact of the rise in
the opportunity cost of a woman’s time at home. On the other hand, if individuals who
work are more likely to be exposed to environmental factors such as stress that end up
producing weight gains, OLS will overestimate the impact of the rise in the opportunity
cost of a woman’s time at home.
In order to address this selection problem I use two non–experimental approaches.
The first of these approaches uses the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the
fact that there is a clear relationship between female labor force participation and the
age structure of children in the household. In particular, I use the institutional fact that
there is minimum age eligibility in public kindergarten. Parents’ ability to enroll a child
in public kindergarten for the academic year depends on whether or not that child has
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turned five at the start of the academic year (with some variability on the age–at–entry
rules among states). Gelbach (2002), using quarter of birth as instruments for public school
enrollment, finds that among married women whose youngest child is five years old, free
public school increases labor supply between 6–15 percent. As a result of this age-entry
rule, the decision of being part of the labor force has elements, discontinuities, that make
it similar to a Regression–Discontinuity (RD) design, first introduced by Thistlethwaite
and Campbell (1960).
The idea of RD design is to incorporate additional information about the selection
process. We know that the decision to take part in the labor force depends at least in part,
on the value of a continuous and observed variable (children’s age) relative to threshold
score (school eligibility) in such a way that the probability of being part of the labor force
is a discontinuous function of this variable at that threshold score. Individuals within a
very small interval around the cutoff point will be very “similar,” with some receiving the
treatment and others not. Then comparing parents having a child just over the cutoff age
with parents having with a child just below the age cutoff for attending public school,
provides a good estimate of the impact of female labor participation on weight related
outcomes. Assuming that each person has one child, and defining z as the child’s age
measured in months in September, the RD design estimated takes the following form:
limz↓60E(y|z)− limz↑60E(y|z)
limz↓60E(flfp|z)− limz↑60E(flfp|z)
. (3.13)
In order to get identification from expression 3.13 we need the following assumptions
to hold:
(i) Assumption 1. The conditional mean function E(ε|z) is continuous at the thresh-
old value z = 60.
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(ii) Assumption 2. The ATE function E(αi1|z) is continuous at the threshold value
z = 60.
(ii) Assumption 3. The ATE function flfpijt is independent of αi1 conditional on z
near to the cutoff.
While only assumption (i) is needed to hold for the case of a constant treatment
effect in a sharp RD design, in our case of a fuzzy RD design with heterogeneous or varying
treatments we need additional assumptions (ii) and (iii) to hold in order to identify the
ATE (Van der Klaauw, 2002). This RD design is similar to an IV approach where in the
RD design the discontinuity acts as an instrument. Under this parallel with IV, assumption
(i) can be seen similar to the assumption of no correlation between the error term and
the instrument such that the discontinuity is only acting trough a change in female labor
force participation. The reasoning behind assumption (ii) is that differences in outcomes
around the neighborhood of the discontinuity come from the treatment and not from
heterogeneity in treatment since individuals with values of z close to the discontinuity are
similar. Finally, assumption (iii) is a local form of the conditional independent assumption
and the reasoning here is that individuals are not being selected or self–selected in the labor
market on the basis of expected gains. In fact, as I have shown with a very simple model,
it is expected that individuals are self selected on the basis of gains. Hahn, Todd and Van
der Klaauw (2002) show that under less restrictive local monotonicity assumptions, similar
to that proposed by Imbens and Angrist (1994), the ratio in expression 3.13 identifies a
LATE at the discontinuity for the subgroup of individuals for whom the treatment changes
discontinuously at the cutoff age.
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In order to estimate expression 3.13, I estimate the following expression,
yijt = α0 + α1 ∗ E(flfpjt|zjt) + g(zjt) + wijt, (3.14)
with wijt = yijt − E(yijt), g(zjt) a specification of E(εijt|zjt) and
E(flfpjt|z) = f(zjt) + γ1{zjt > 60}, (3.15)
where f(zjt) is a continuous function of zjt at zjt = 60 and 1{} an indicator function.
Female labor participation not only increases the cost of home production (home
cooking), it also has an impact on the level of activity, i.e., calories burned. While the
impact of home production may affect all members in the household equally10, the impact
on calories burned is not homogeneous across individuals. Women substitute market
production for household production with an ambiguous impact on the total number of
calories burned. Children may allocate less time to physical activity and more time to
watching TV or playing video games with an overall reduction in total calories burned.
Finally, husbands may not change at all their level of calories burned. In order to address
these differences in the types of “treatment” we split the sample into two relevant groups
that may be affected by female labor force participation: married men and married women.
While married men are mainly exposed to the shift in the cost of home cooking, married
and single women are also exposed to a change in the level of activity. Therefore, under this
framework we would expect the impact of female labor force participation to be larger for
the sample of married men. It is important to mention that by focusing on the sample of
married men we are not addressing the problem that women select non–randomly into the
10Under the assumption of scale economies in home cooking, household members should share “one pot“
such that any shift in the cost of home production should impact all members in the household in a similar
fashion.
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labor market. There are many factors at the level of the household that may be correlated
with female labor participation and husband body weight. For example, individuals might
match (among other factors) on eating behavior and/or preferences for physical activity in
the marriage market. Then, more active women (more likely to engage in paid activities)
will be married to more active men (less likely to have weight problems) producing a
downward bias in the estimate.
Figure 3.7 shows graphically the source of identification that I am trying to exploit.
In general as the age of the youngest child in the family increases, the proportion of women
working increases monotonically. However, after the age of 60 months we observe a jump
in this proportion. In fact this jump or discontinuity looks more evident when we adjust
a cubic polynomio in the youngest child’s age and allowing a different intercept for those
that have a youngest child older than 60 months. While a discontinuity at the age of
60 months is found when I repeat the exercise but define the discontinuity at 48 and 72
months of age, no signs of discontinuity are found.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show in the same fashion the profile of BMI and obesity rate
against age of the youngest child. For both of these outcomes, there is an increase in the
dispersion and the average as the youngest child gets older, although a jump or disconti-
nuity is less clear around the age of 60 months.
In a second empirical approach I use the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) to develop a reduced form analysis given limited household information. In par-
ticular, I study the impact of exogenous changes to the demand for labor. Following the
approach developed by Bartik (1991) and employed by Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound
and Holzer (2000), and Autor and Duggan (2003), I exploit cross-state differences in in-
dustrial composition and national-level changes in female and male employment to predict
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individual state employment growth. Specifically, I calculate the predicted employment
change θˆjt
s
for state j and sample s between years t0 and t as,
θˆjt
s
=
∑
k
βsjkt0θ
s
kt s = male, female, (3.16)
where θskt is the percentage change in industry k employment share nationally for sample
s and βsjkt0 is the share of employment of individuals in sample s, state j in industry k in
the initial year.
This methodology predicts what each state’s change in employment would be if
industry level employment changes occurred uniformly across states and state-level indus-
trial composition was fixed by sex in the short term. States that had a relatively large
share of female workers in industries declining nationally will, for example have predicted
female employment decline.
3.5 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics.
3.5.1 Data and Variables
My analysis utilizes two data sets. The first data source, the National Health In-
terview Survey (NHIS) is a household survey fielded annually since 1957 by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census for the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The NHIS
samples the civilian, non-institutionalized population in the United States. The NHIS is
a cross-sectional household survey; sampling and interviews are conducted continuously
throughout the year. The sampling plan follows a multistage area probability design that
permits the representative sampling of households. Each year the NHIS randomly samples
approximately 48,000 households with 108,000 members from 201 primary sampling units
nationally. While the NHIS has been conducted continuously since 1957, the content of
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the survey has been updated about every 10-15 years. The main objective of the NHIS is
to monitor the health of the United States population through the collection and analysis
of data on a broad range of health topics. A major strength of this survey is the ability
to display health characteristics by many demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
The NHIS contains data on height and weight for individuals older than 17 years old. This
analysis uses every survey year from 1982 through 2000.
The NHIS contains both information on female labor participation and children’s age
structure. This makes this dataset useful in implementing the RD design. The downward
side of this survey is that in most years there is information only on region of residence.
Region is probably too large as geographic area to analyze using demand shocks described
above.
The second data source is the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).
The BRFSS is an ongoing, state-based telephone surveillance system supported by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The purpose of the BRFSS is to
collect uniform, state-based data on preventive health practices and risk behaviors that
are linked to chronic diseases, injuries, and preventable infectious diseases in the U.S.
population. Data is collected through monthly telephone interviews conducted among a
sample of each state’s adult population.11
There are two difficulties with the BRFSS. First because BRFSS is not a household
survey we do not observe the spouse’s labor force status. Second, before 1994, the BRFSS
11Telephone interviews have some limitations: Non–coverage of persons in households without tele-
phones, interviews that are shorter than in-person interviews and collected data that cannot be verified by
physical measurement or visual means. Based on the 1990 census, 95% of households in the United States
have telephones. There is variation by state, as telephone coverage ranged from 87% in Mississippi to 98%
in Massachusetts.
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does not include information about children in the household. This is required to use the
RD design estimation. Given these limitations, I limit the analysis of the BRFSS data
to study the impact of female demand shocks on the weight–related outcomes of married
men and women.
The advantage of BRFSS is that it includes information on levels of physical activity
and nutrition in addition to weight and height. This allows us to examine directly the
effects of female labor employment shocks on nutritional intake and physical activity which
is important for two reasons. First, as discussed above the nutritional profile and level of
activity might be correlated among family members. BRFSS gives us a unique opportunity
to control to some degree for those factors directly. Second, weight is a stock measure
which is the accumulation of decisions on physical activity and nutritional intake. In the
short–run female labor force participation may be more related to these factors than to
weight directly, although it may be correlated with weight in the long–run.
I use three dummy variables for level of physical activity. The first one takes a
value of one if the individual participated in any physical activities or exercise, and zero
otherwise. The second dummy variable takes a value of one if the individual participated
in any physical activities or exercise other than walking, and zero otherwise. Finally
the third dummy variable takes a value of one if an individual reports exercising on a
regular basis and zero otherwise.12 In addition to these three measures of activity I have
information about the usual number of miles an individual jogs, runs, walks or swims, the
number of times that an individual performed a particular activity in the previous month,
12To define if an individual exercises regularly I use the information about the number of times per week
or per month she or he took part in an activity. If the person answered any number of times per week I
define that individual as doing regular exercise and if she/he defines the regularity in terms of times per
month, I define that person as doing exercise on an irregular basis.
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and the number of minutes spent in that activity. The information about nutrition is
reported as number of servings of a particular type of food. I use the number of servings
per day as the unit of analysis. The types of food that I analyze are: Fruit, Vegetables,
Green Salad, Potatoes (not French fries), Carrots. I study these five types of food because
they are available for the eleven years under analysis, 1990-200013.
The data used to construct the estimates of changes in female employment by states
is the March CPS for the period 1990–2000 where the weights for male or female employ-
ment by industry and states comes from the March CPS for the year 1989.
Because the information collected in the NHIS and BRFSS correspond to individuals
aged 18 and older, the impact of female labor force participation on child obesity or other
outcome for children is not addressed in this chapter.
3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
The information about weight and height allows us to construct the Body Mass Index
(BMI). NHIS and BRFSS information about weights and heights is self–reported. There
is evidence that people are under–reporting weight; heavier people are the most likely to
under–report. To address this problem I use information from the Third National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III) that contains self–reported and actual
weight. Then by estimating the relationship between self–reported weight or height and
the measured weight or height (and other covariates) I correct self–reported measures in
the data sets used in this chapter.
Figure 3.10 shows growth in the obesity rate with an increase of almost 15 percentage
points during the period 1978–2000. There has also been a monotonic increase in the
13It could be interesting to use servings of french fries, because they may quite correlated with fast–food
consumption. However the information on french fries is available only for some years prior 1994.
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average BMI. Although both surveys show the same pattern, NHIS reveals a higher average
BMI and a higher obesity rate in all overlapping years. These differences can be explained
in part by a higher proportion of minorities in the NHIS than in the BRFSS. Minorities
have on average a higher BMI (as shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 give us a closer look at the shift in the distribution of BMI by
comparing the extremes of the periods under analysis. At first glance, the distributions
seem similar. This similarity contrasts with the fact that for the year 2000 we find ap-
proximately double the incidence of obesity observed in 1990 (BRFSS) and 15 percentage
points higher than in 1978. The contrast is resolved by realizing that although there is a
smooth shift in the complete distribution, a bigger mass has approached and passed the
cut off of obesity, defined as BMI over 30.
Figures 3.13 to 3.14 show an interesting aspect of the rise in BMI during the last
20 years. First, for the complete period covered, the sample of married men with working
spouses have a higher average BMI than the sample of married men with spouses who are
not working. However, as we already indicated, this regularity may be only a selection
phenomenon. On the other hand, married working women in all years have a lower average
BMI than married women who are not working, a pattern which can also be related to
sample selection. However, the rise in the average BMI has been greater for working
women, with a reduction in the percentage difference from approximately 4% in 1982 to
1% in the year 2000 when we use the NHIS and from approximately 2% in 1990 to almost
no difference in 2000 when the BRFSS is used. A potential explanation for this trend is
that the rise in female labor participation has been associated with women having lower
levels of education who not only face a higher opportunity in home production but also
are not getting enough resources in the labor market compared to the first women that
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started the incursion in paid activities, who probably were the most able.
Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 present the descriptive statistics for the various variables
and samples I use in the analysis. In addition to the information related to BMI that
we observe in both surveys, the BRFSS shows that a lower proportion of working women
(married or single) report exercising relative to non–working woman. Also, for the sample
of working women, we observe that when they do exercise, they do less often (fewer times
per month) or less intensely (miles or minutes) compared to women who are not working.
Finally, the information about nutrition reveals that working women eat less of those types
of food that we could define as “healthy”.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 RD-Design analysis
Table 3.4 presents the impact of youngest child’s school eligibility on female em-
ployment. Other variables I use in the model are a cubic polynomial in the age in months
of the youngest child, respondent’s age and age square, dummies by education, region of
residence and race. The results show that those families with a youngest child eligible
to attend school present a higher rate of female employment, approximately 6 percentage
points higher. Theory tells us, keeping all the rest constant, that those mothers who rejoin
the labor market have either higher potential wages or lower non-labor incomes. While a
woman’s education may be positively correlated with wages, her husband’s education is
negatively correlated with non–labor incomes. Dividing the samples between individuals
with less than high school and those with high school or more, I find the opposite result.
For those men with high school or more, I observe a higher point estimate on female em-
ployment than those with less than high school. I also find a higher point estimate for the
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sample of married women with less than high school. An interpretation of these results is
the sorting process that we observe in the marriage market. Despite a positive impact on
female employment for the sample of married men with less than high school, the value
is not statistically significant which might be related to the considerably smaller sample
size of men with less than high school.
Table 3.5 presents the impact of school eligibility on the logarithm of BMI and
on obesity. Married women’s average BMI and obesity fall with female employment.
Interestingly, the impact of female employment is to raise the BMI and obesity rate of
husbands, although the results are not statistically significant. Dividing the samples by
level of education (less than high school and high school or more), we observe a stronger
positive impact on both outcomes for the sample of individuals with less than a high school
education. In fact for married women with a high school education or more we observe
that school eligibility reduces the likelihood of being obese by almost 2 percentage points.
These results are consistent with the fact that when mothers return to the labor market
only those with higher non-labor incomes or higher salaries (higher income effect) are able
to afford the cost of an increase in home production. By dividing the sample, we are able
to capture this heterogeneity associated with education levels, but at the cost of losing
power in our estimates.
In order to account for this heterogeneity while trying to minimize the cost of lower
power associated with smaller sample sizes, I allow the impact of female employment to
change by level of education while other coefficients are restricted to be the same across
education groups. In order to do that, I define a dummy variable, ”Less than HS”, that
takes a value of one for those individuals with less than high school and zero otherwise and
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I interact this with female employment 14. For this specification, we have two endogenous
variables (female employment and its interaction with the variable ”Less than HS”). I
instrument these two variables with school eligibility and its interaction with this new
dummy variable. In order to compare the magnitude of this estimate, I also estimate a
model without interaction for both sub–samples.
The result for the second stage and OLS estimates are presented in tables 3.6 and
3.7 for BMI, and tables 3.8 and 3.9 for obesity. Tables 3.6 and 3.8 show the results for the
complete sample, and tables 3.7 and 3.9 for the sub–samples.
Results for BMI in table 3.6 reveal that female employment has a considerable
positive impact on BMI for those individuals with lower levels of education. For married
men with less than a high school education, I find that female employment increases
BMI by approximately 13 percentage points (the 11.73 marginal effect associated with
individuals with less than high school plus 1.17 percentage points of common effect). In
the same fashion, for married women with less than high school, we find that female
employment increases BMI by approximately 12 percentage points. However, only for
the sample of married men am I able to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of these
coefficients (i.e., the impact of female employment for those individuals with less than
high school) equals zero. It is interesting to note that the impact for the sub–sample of
married men with less than high school in table 3.7 is almost the same as the one we find
14Formally I tested the equality between the restricted (only the coefficient of female employment is
different between the two samples) and unrestricted model (all coefficients are different between both
samples). For married men I am not able to reject the null hypothesis that both models are statistically
equal with p–values of 0.17 and 0.19 for BMI and Obesity, respectively. However for the sample of married
women I rejected the equality between these models with p–values of 0.0016 and 0.01 for BMI and obesity,
respectively.
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for the model with interaction in the complete sample, 12.65 percentage points versus 12.9
percentage points, respectively.
In order to get the magnitude of this impact, consider an individual with a weight
of 70 kilograms (approx. 155 pounds) whose height is 1.7 meters (approx. 5 feet 7 inches),
i.e., a BMI equal to 72
1.722
= 22.34. For this individual an increase of 13% in his BMI
implies a new BMI of 27.7 which is an increase of approximately 9 kilograms (approx. 20
pounds).
The results for obesity in table 3.8 do not show a statistically significant impact,
neither for the sample of married men nor for the sample of married women. Despite this,
the interaction term suggests a positive and significant marginal impact for women with
less than high school.
This result of a positive and significant impact of female employment on BMI but
no impact on obesity for married men suggests that the impact is concentrated mainly on
the bottom part of the BMI distribution. These elements are important when we try to
move to a more policy–oriented discussion. While an increase of 20 pounds has a negative
connotation for someone closer to the threshold of being overweight or obese, for someone
underweight an increase of 20 pounds might be even be positive.
As Van der Klaauw (2002) argues, identification of the treatment in a RD-design
depends on having the correct specification of functions f(zjt) and g(zjt)in expressions
3.14 and 3.15. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present a sensitivity analysis for the sample of married
men. As discussed earlier, the direct impact of female employment is very noisy and
non–significant for any of the specifications. On the other hand, the marginal effect on
individuals with less than high school is quite robust to the different specifications with the
exception of the linear specification of g(zjt) where lower values for this marginal impact is
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found. Table 3.11 presents the p-values for the null hypothesis that the impact of female
employment is zero for individuals with less than high school. In fact if we about the
linear specification for any of these two functions, in half of the cases we reject the null
hypothesis at 5 percentage level, and in 3 of 4 cases at a 10 percentage level of confidence.
3.6.2 Demands Shocks: BRFSS.
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 show the estimates for the impact of female and male demand
shocks. Table 3.14 presents the estimates when I do not allow the impact of female demand
shocks to vary with education levels (Less than High School, LHS; High School,HS; Some
College, SC; and College or more, C). Table 3.15 presents the estimates when I do allow
the demand shocks to vary.
The results in 3.13 reveal for both samples, men and women, a positive impact
associated with a shock in female demand on either BMI or obesity but a negative impact
associated with male demand shocks. However, only for the sub–sample of women are these
results statistically different from zero. One potential explanation for these differences in
sign between male and female demand shocks might be the fact that men have a more
inelastic supply. Then a particular shift in demand would imply at least in the short–run
a steeper increase in wages, and a higher income effect, allowing some wives to leave the
labor force. On the other hand, an increase in female demand, probably from a more
elastic supply, implies more women are in paid activities with the consequent reduction
in the time allocated in food production, but the same amount for men in household
production. Another potential explanation is that female time has traditionally been
important to food preparation both inside and outside the home. If this is true then
food preparation outside the home also had the incentive to substitute out of labor and
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into other factors (food; capital) in the production function of meals such as fast–food
restaurants or prepared food. At the same time, suppose families, are willing to pay a
positive price for the taste of a meal but a negative price for the meal’s calories or lack of
assortment. Profit maximizing firms may substitute into tasty and cheaper food but out
of low calorie and diverse food.
When I split the impact of female demand change, we can see again the degree of
heterogeneity by level of education. For the sub–sample of married men, I find that those
with less than a high school degree or those with a college degree or more have an increase
in BMI and obesity when female employment rises (for BMI only at 10% confidence level).
The cost of home production has two components: cost of market goods and the cost of
time. Every household faces an increase in the cost of time when female wages increase.
Households with lower levels of education (lower levels of non–labor income) can only
afford more McDonald’s type of food. As households get higher wages they can afford
better quality food. However, as wages get even higher and there is less time needed
eating “healthy”, individuals may even be willing to increase the consumption of more
calorie–intensive food if it is less time–intensive. To demonstrate this I construct two
dummy variables. The first variable Rec. F&V, stands for recommended daily amount
of fruit and vegetable servings, takes the value one for those individuals that eat 4.5 or
more servings a day and zero otherwise.15 The second variable NR F&V, takes a value
of one for those individuals that eat less than 1.5 servings a day and zero otherwise.
Consumptions under this level are associated with a higher incidence of chronic diseases
(Hung HC, Joshipura KJ, Jiang R., et al., 2004). The results show that women and men
152005 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, US Department
of Agriculture.
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with higher levels of education are more likely to eat less than this minimal amount of
fruit and vegetables. Only for married men with a high school degree do I find that female
demand shocks reduce the likelihood of eating more than 4.5 recommended number of
servings.
Finally, I also find for married men with higher levels of education that a demand
shock in female employment is associated with higher levels of activity. This observation
plus the positive impact on obesity and BMI for this group suggests that the potential
imbalance comes from a higher consumption of calories which is consistent with the lower
consumption of fruit and vegetables.
3.7 Conclusion
Using the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) I find that female employment
has a positive impact on Body Mass Index (BMI) for married men with less than a high
school level of education. However I do not find an impact for all samples of women
or men completing high school or more. This finding is consistent with men facing an
increase in the cost of home cooking with a positive impact on body weight. Women may
face an offsetting rise in the level of physical activity, and households with husbands with
higher income (i.e., higher levels of education) can afford prepared foods that are less
calorie intensive. The magnitude of these findings is larger than found elsewhere in the
literature. This is primarily because I take account of the endogeneity of female labor force
participation. The analysis from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
survey reveals that married men with less than a high school education, or married men
with a college degree or more, face an increase in their BMI and the likelihood of being
obese, if they live in states with a positive demand shock for female labor. The results
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also show that for married men with higher levels of education, positive female demand
shocks produce an increase in the levels of physical activity. This last element, plus the
positive impact of female demand shocks on BMI and obesity rate, suggests that the
channel through which female labor force participation raises a man’s weight must be
through higher consumption of calories. This is consistent with the lower consumption of
fruits and vegetables that we find associated with positive female demand shocks for this
group.
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Figure 3.1: Hours spent working
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Figure 3.2: Total Time Cooking: Food production plus calorie reduction
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Figure 3.3: Time volume production
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Figure 3.4: Time calorie reduction
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Figure 3.5: Food Consumption
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Figure 3.6: Total Consumption of Calories
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Figure 3.7: Average Female Employment by age in September measured in months of the
youngest child
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Figure 3.8: Average BMI by age in September measured in months of the youngest child
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Figure 3.9: Obesity rate by age in September measured in months of the youngest child
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Figure 3.10: Evolving BMI and Obesity rates
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Married Men Married Women
Non-working Working Non-working Working
Age 52.653 42.780 49.778 39.958
(17.790) (12.784) (17.631) (12.008)
Number of children 0.897 1.028 0.923 1.034
(1.286) (1.185) (1.296) (1.186)
Less than High School 0.320 0.187 0.307 0.146
(0.466) (0.390) (0.461) (0.353)
High School 0.324 0.362 0.412 0.431
(0.468) (0.481) (0.492) (0.495)
More than High School 0.357 0.451 0.281 0.424
(0.479) (0.498) (0.450) (0.494)
White 0.651 0.600 0.652 0.599
(0.477) (0.490) (0.476) (0.490)
Black 0.049 0.069 0.048 0.068
(0.217) (0.254) (0.214) (0.252)
Asian 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.017
(0.110) (0.119) (0.115) (0.128)
Hispanic 0.278 0.307 0.276 0.308
(0.448) (0.461) (0.447) (0.462)
BMI 25.842 26.153 24.822 24.200
(3.920) (3.962) (5.101) (4.827)
Obesity 0.143 0.154 0.171 0.143
(0.350) (0.361) (0.376) (0.351)
Standard Deviations in parentheses.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics, NHIS. Means for selected variables, 1982–2000
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Married Men Married Women
Non-working Working
Age 47.34 40.63 52.64
(15.39) (10.94) (17.69)
Number of children 0.94 1.06 0.83
(1.23) (1.19) (1.29)
Less than High School 0.12 0.06 0.17
(0.33) (0.24) (0.38)
High School 0.31 0.33 0.39
(0.46) (0.47) (0.49)
More than High School 0.56 0.61 0.44
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
White 0.85 0.85 0.87
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34)
Black 0.05 0.06 0.04
(0.22) (0.24) (0.19)
Asian 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Hispanic 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
BMI 26.70 24.98 25.25
(4.14) (5.06) (5.06)
Obesity 0.17 0.14 0.15
(0.38) (0.35) (0.36)
Standard Deviations in parentheses.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics, BRFSS. Means for selected variables, 1994–2000
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Figure 3.11: Body Mass Index, NHIS: 1982 vs. 2000
0
.0
5
.1
25 35
10 20 30 40 50
25 35
10 20 30 40 50
1990 2000
D
e
n
s
it
y
bmi
Graphs by year
Figure 3.12: Body Mass Index, BRFSS: 1990 vs. 2000
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Figure 3.13: Body Mass Index, NHIS: 1982 vs. 2000. Married Men
22.0
22.5
23.0
23.5
24.0
24.5
25.0
25.5
26.0
26.5
27.0
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Year
B
M
I
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
%
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
BMI Married Non Working Women BMI Married Working Women
Percentage Difference
Figure 3.14: Body Mass Index, NHIS: 1982 vs. 2000. Married Women.
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Figure 3.15: Body Mass Index, BRFSS: 1990 vs. 2000. Married Women.
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Married Men Married Women
All Non-working Working
Any activity or exercise 0.72 0.74 0.70
(0.45) (0.44) (0.46)
Any activity or exercise, but walking 0.45 0.31 0.28
(0.50) (0.46) (0.45)
Regular activity or exercise 0.56 0.61 0.59
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Fruit 0.71 0.86 0.97
(0.72) (0.81) (0.84)
Vegetables 0.48 0.53 0.56
(0.47) (0.48) (0.51)
Green Salad 1.19 1.35 1.38
(0.86) (0.94) (0.92)
Potatoes 0.25 0.30 0.32
(0.36) (0.41) (0.44)
Carrots 0.37 0.35 0.40
(0.38) (0.36) (0.40)
Miles 1.98 1.75 1.55
(1.97) (1.50) (1.76)
Times per Month 12.64 12.77 14.36
(8.89) (8.01) (8.85)
Minutes 126.66 91.14 88.37
(96.35) (72.28) (72.77)
Standard Deviations in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics (Continuation), BRFSS. 1994–2000
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Men
Complete Sample Less than HS HS or More
γˆ 0.0644 0.0455 0.0692
[0.0123]*** [0.0304] [0.0134]***
Women
Less than HS HS or More
γˆ 0.0867 0.0595
[0.0303]*** [0.0131]***
Obs. 115483 20711 94772
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.4: First Stage. Impact of age eligibility on female employment. NHIS.
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Men
Complete Sample Less than HS HS or More
Log (BMI) 0.0013 0.017 -0.0024
[0.0036] [0.0096]* [0.0038]
Obesity 0.0084 0.0364 0.001
[0.0086] [0.0223] [0.0092]
Obs. 113828 20711 93592
Women
Complete Sample Less than HS HS or More
Log (BMI) -0.005 0.0038 -0.0072
[0.0046] [0.0128] [0.0049]
Obesity -0.0153 0.0012 -0.0194
[0.0081]* [0.0243] [0.0084]**
Obs. 118107 19669 98438
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.5: Reduced Form. Impact of age eligibility on Selected Outcomes. NHIS.
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Men OLS IV OLS IV
F. Employment 0.0072 0.0326 0.0064 0.0117
[0.0015]*** [0.0388] [0.0016]*** [0.0365]
F.Employment X Less than HS 0.0032 0.1173
[0.0043] [0.0493]**
p-value. H0: F. Emp.+F.Emp. X LHS=0 0.0153 0.0455
Women
F. Employment -0.0183 -0.0248 -0.0103 -0.0738
[0.0019]*** [0.0513] [0.0020]*** [0.0473]
F.Employment X Less than HS -0.0087 0.1964
[0.0056] [0.0718]***
p-value. H0: F. Emp.+F.Emp. X LHS=0 0.0003 0.1775
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.6: Impact of Female Employment on Log(BMI). Complete Sample NHIS.
Less than HS HS or More
Men OLS IV OLS IV
F. Employment 0.0084 0.1265 0.0066 -0.0241
[0.0040]** [0.0871] [0.0016]*** [0.0410]
Women
F. Employment -0.0198 0.2017 -0.0099 -0.0912
[0.0052]*** [0.1282] [0.0020]*** [0.0578]
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.7: Impact of Female Employment on Log(BMI). Sub–samples NHIS.
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Men OLS IV OLS IV
F. Employment 0.0116 0.1574 0.0125 0.1355
[0.0036]*** [0.0946]* [0.0039]*** [0.0886]
F.Employment X Less than HS -0.0021 0.1253
[0.0102] [0.1144]
p-value. H0: F. Emp.+F.Emp. X LHS=0 0.2715 0.0905
Women
F. Employment -0.0314 -0.0362 -0.018 -0.1292
[0.0035]*** [0.0927] [0.0036]*** [0.0851]
F.Employment X Less than HS -0.0228 0.3657
[0.0108]** [0.1373]***
p-value. H0: F. Emp.+F.Emp. X LHS=0 0.0001 0.1651
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.8: Impact of Female Employment on Obesity. Complete Sample NHIS.
Less than HS HS or More
Men OLS IV OLS IV
F. Employment 0.007 0.3284 0.0132 0.035
[0.0095] [0.2218] [0.0039]*** [0.0965]
Women
F. Employment -0.0443 0.213 -0.0166 -0.1154
[0.0102]*** [0.2377] [0.0036]*** [0.0997]
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.9: Impact of Female Employment on Obesity). Sub–samples NHIS.
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g(zjt)
f(zjt) Linear Quadratic Cubic 4th 5th
Linear -0.014 0.0122 0.0132 0.0071 -0.0066
[0.0235] [0.0371] [0.0371] [0.0425] [0.0451]
Quadratic -0.0248 0.0182 0.019 0.0162 0.0052
[0.0211] [0.0368] [0.0369] [0.0421] [0.0445]
Cubic -0.0249 0.0174 0.0117 0.0053 -0.0064
[0.0211] [0.0368] [0.0365] [0.0414] [0.0438]
4th -0.0223 0.0222 0.0157 0.0066 -0.0057
[0.0209] [0.0360] [0.0356] [0.0414] [0.0438]
5th -0.021 0.026 0.0199 0.0115 -0.0069
[0.0208] [0.0360] [0.0356] [0.0413] [0.0433]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.10: Sensitivity analysis. F.Employment Coefficient. Log(BMI). Complete Sample
of Married Men NHIS, 1982–2000.
115
g(zjt)
f(zjt) Linear Quadratic Cubic 4th 5th
Linear 0.0997 0.1098 0.1099 0.1068 0.0989
[0.0480]** [0.0497]** [0.0498]** [0.0504]** [0.0499]**
Quadratic 0.0991 0.1193 0.1191 0.1178 0.1115
[0.0478]** [0.0497]** [0.0497]** [0.0503]** [0.0497]**
Cubic 0.097 0.1168 0.1173 0.1142 0.1081
[0.0476]** [0.0493]** [0.0493]** [0.0497]** [0.0492]**
4th 0.1002 0.1194 0.1195 0.1129 0.1073
[0.0476]** [0.0495]** [0.0494]** [0.0497]** [0.0493]**
5th 0.0989 0.1192 0.1192 0.1133 0.1064
[0.0475]** [0.0496]** [0.0495]** [0.0499]** [0.0490]**
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, region of residence, dummies by education,
dummies by race, number of children and cubic polynomio in the age of the youngest child
the previous September.
Table 3.11: Sensitivity analysis. F.Employment X LHS impact. Log(BMI). Complete
Sample of Married Men NHIS, 1982–2000.
g(zjt)
f(zjt) Linear Quadratic Cubic 4th 5th
Linear 0.1117 0.0634 0.0615 0.116 0.2168
Quadratic 0.1602 0.0341 0.0335 0.0594 0.1096
Cubic 0.1712 0.0377 0.0455 0.0892 0.1595
4th 0.1369 0.0262 0.0332 0.0891 0.16
5th 0.1369 0.023 0.029 0.0763 0.1636
Table 3.12: Sensitivity analysis. p-value. H0: F. Emp.+F.Emp. X LHS=0. Log(BMI).
Complete Sample of Married Men NHIS, 1982–2000.
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M. Men
Log(BMI) Obesity Any Act. Any Act. Reg. Act. Rec. F&V NR F&V Miles Times Time
or Exerc. but walk per Month
Fshock 0.0011 0.0043 0.0135 0.0076 0.0003 -0.0024 0.0079 0.0305 -0.1437 2.1459
[0.0011] [0.0026] [0.0056]** [0.0056] [0.0082] [0.0038] [0.0066] [0.0872] [0.1339] [2.3363]
Mshock -0.0013 -0.0022 0.0094 0.0025 0.008 0.0003 -0.005 -0.1144 -0.1215 -0.5598
[0.0012] [0.0030] [0.0095] [0.0072] [0.0174] [0.0047] [0.0053] [0.1304] [0.2311] [2.3070]
Married Women
Fshock 0.0028 0.0045 0.0063 -0.0124 0.0025 0.0023 0.0067 -0.012 0.0501 -0.6593
[0.0014]** [0.0025]* [0.0046] [0.0060]** [0.0075] [0.0034] [0.0048] [0.0555] [0.1322] [1.8281]
Mshock -0.0037 -0.0064 0.0004 0.0045 0.0046 0.0049 -0.0029 -0.0367 0.0661 0.8214
[0.0014]** [0.0026]** [0.0067] [0.0067] [0.0077] [0.0059] [0.0042] [0.1084] [0.2096] [1.8379]
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, state of residence, number of children and dummies by education, year and race.
Table 3.13: Impact of Demand shocks on selected outcomes. BRFSS, 1990–2000.
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M. Men
Log(BMI) Obesity Any Act. Any Act. Reg. Act. Rec. F&V NR F&V Miles Times Time
or Exerc. but walk per Month
FshockXLHS 0.0062 0.0177 0.0143 -0.0072 -0.0005 -0.005 0.0043 0.1064 -0.5762 5.3398
[0.0036]* [0.0082]** [0.0091] [0.0163] [0.0236] [0.0057] [0.0142] [0.1595] [0.5048] [5.7226]
FshockXHS 0.0009 -0.0023 0.0076 0.0089 -0.0155 -0.0051 0.0018 0.0345 -0.355 6.8384
[0.0016] [0.0045] [0.0080] [0.0101] [0.0123] [0.0027]* [0.0088] [0.1157] [0.2185] [2.8190]**
FshockXSC -0.0026 -0.0019 0.0238 0.0225 0.0232 0.0026 0.0051 0.0039 -0.0936 -1.8897
[0.0018] [0.0045] [0.0119]* [0.0118]* [0.0132]* [0.0050] [0.0096] [0.0990] [0.2331] [4.0260]
FshockXC 0.0025 0.011 0.0109 -0.0016 -0.0025 -0.003 0.0172 0.0324 0.0617 0.3602
[0.0013]* [0.0037]*** [0.0052]** [0.0100] [0.0113] [0.0065] [0.0070]** [0.0788] [0.1231] [2.8488]
Mshock -0.0013 -0.0021 0.0095 0.0025 0.008 0.0003 -0.0052 -0.1143 -0.1224 -0.5465
[0.0012] [0.0029] [0.0095] [0.0072] [0.0174] [0.0046] [0.0053] [0.1303] [0.2302] [2.2990]
Married Women
FshockXLHS -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0389 -0.0019 0.0002 0.0174 0.0139 -0.0582 -2.4185
[0.0059] [0.0111] [0.0239] [0.0128]*** [0.0233] [0.0049] [0.0110] [0.0737] [0.4011] [4.2292]
FshockXHS 0.0026 -0.0033 0.0099 -0.0181 0.0014 0.0013 -0.003 -0.0398 0.0957 -1.7901
[0.0019] [0.0044] [0.0062] [0.0083]** [0.0113] [0.0048] [0.0085] [0.0540] [0.2630] [2.4035]
FschockXSC 0.0029 0.0065 0.0089 0.0006 0.0055 0.0049 0.0107 -0.0143 -0.1124 2.363
[0.0023] [0.0033]* [0.0078] [0.0104] [0.0112] [0.0057] [0.0051]** [0.0616] [0.1081] [3.8620]
FshockXC 0.0045 0.0129 0.0035 -0.0098 0.0024 0.0018 0.0088 0.0136 0.1763 -1.9751
[0.0019]** [0.0030]*** [0.0064] [0.0063] [0.0097] [0.0041] [0.0041]** [0.0693] [0.1386] [2.1309]
Mshock -0.0038 -0.0065 0.0002 0.0045 0.0046 0.0048 -0.0028 -0.0365 0.066 0.8128
[0.0015]** [0.0027]** [0.0067] [0.0067] [0.0077] [0.0059] [0.0041] [0.1085] [0.2095] [1.8244]
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Others covariates in the model are age, age square, state of residence, number of children and dummies by education, year and race.
Table 3.14: Impact of Demand shocks on selected outcomes. BRFSS, 1990–2000.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
The role of family background in human capital accumulation is well recognized in
the literature. However the magnitude and channels through which fertility and female
labor employment alter human capital accumulation still is not clear.
Chapter 2 uses US Census data for the year 1980 and multiple births as a source
of variation in family size, to support Becker’s model. An exogenous increase in family
size reduces the probability of a child attending private school, increases the probability
of sharing a bedroom, lowers the labor participation of the child’s mother and raises the
probability of divorce. However, for a second group of variables that I believe are more
closely related to child well-being, such as highest grade attended, grade retention, teen
pregnancy or likelihood of dropping out school, I do not find evidence that family size
has an impact. These results come to advance the literature in three ways. First, I use
data for a developed country, the US Census data for the year 1980. While multiple births
may not necessarily change family size in an underdeveloped country given typically larger
family sizes, in a developed country like the US, most families that have a multiple birth
in a second or higher pregnancy exceed their desired family size. Also, it may be that in
a developed country families have more ways to reallocate resources. When a family in a
developed country is pushed towards subsistence substitution out of food, it may not be
feasible to protect child education. But in developed countries, families may have more
margins on which to adjust to shocks to family size. This higher degree of freedom among
different type of investment makes less clear the link between a change in family size and
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child wellbeing. In order to address this last point, I make a clear distinction between
variables that can be linked to investment in children from those that are closer to the
wellbeing of children. This is my second contribution. Finally the third added value of
my paper is including a group of variables that affect the family more generally. The idea
is that families that face an exogenous change in the number of children may change the
time and money spent in other activities, perhaps leaving untouched the investment per
child.
In order to study the role of number of children on child investment and child
wellbeing in chapter 2, I use the same strategy that was used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1980), that is the use of multiple births as exogenous and unexpected shift in family size.
Why do we need this exogenous and expected source of variation? First, Becker’s model
explains that families that face bigger family size are the ones that not only face a higher
price of quality, an effect that I would like to estimate, but they are also the ones that have
a relatively lower preference for child investment for any level of investment. Therefore
even if we were able to “constrain” the number of children in families, we would not be
assured that the level of investment per child would be the same in families with a desire
for larger families relative to families with a desire for smaller family size. Second, and
not necessarily implied by the models, is the fact that there might be other unobserved
variables that are correlated simultaneously with family size and child quality, creating a
spurious relationship between this two variables.
My results are consistent with Becker’s model. Family size affects resources dedi-
cated to child investment such as the probability of attending private school, the probabil-
ity of sharing bedroom, female labor participation and probability of divorce. Nevertheless,
I do not observe an impact on variables that I used as measures of child wellbeing such as
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teen pregnancy, grade retention, highest grade completed or attended and probability of
dropping out.
These findings may explain to some degree the differences in the results of the
impact of number of children in the family on measures of wellbeing among studies that
not only use the same measure of quality but also some using the same identification
strategy. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2004) both
use the same measure of quality and the same identification strategy. However, these
researchers come to different conclusions on the trade–off between the number of children
and educational attainments. While Rosenzweig and Wolpin find that family size has a
negative impact on education, Black et al. find no impact of family size on education. The
difference in the results may be related to the type of households that have been studied.
Wolpin uses data from India where we could think that households have fewer degrees of
freedom when the face a exogenous change in family size to allocated resources among
different types of investments so the relationship between investment and wellbeing. On
the other hand, Black and company use data from Norway where it is easier to imagine
that households have higher degrees of freedom, so the relationship between a particular
type of investment and wellbeing is less clear.
If the finding of this chapter are correct, family planning efforts in developed coun-
tries may not necessarily improve child wellbeing. The success of such policies will depend
on the families’ ability to reallocate resources. In developing economies with less devel-
oped markets and institutions, a reduction in family size would improve child wellbeing
more than in a developed economy.
In Chapter 3, using the National Health Interview (NHIS), I find that female em-
ployment has a positive impact on Body Mass Index (BMI) for married men with less
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than high school. However I do not find an impact for all samples of women or men with
high school or more. This finding is consistent with men facing an increase in the cost
of home cooking with a positive impact on body weight. Women face an offsetting rise
in the level of physical activity and households with husbands with higher income (i.e.,
higher education) can afford prepared food that is less calorie intensive. The magnitude
of these findings is larger than found elsewhere in the literature. This is primarily because
I take account of the endogeneity of female labor force participation. The analysis from
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey reveals that married men
with less than high school, or married men with college degree or more, face an increase
in their BMI and the likelihood of being obese if they live in states with a positive shock
in female labor demand. The results also show that for married men with higher levels
of education, female demand shocks produce an increase in the levels of physical activity.
This last element plus the positive impact of female demand shocks on BMI and obesity
rate suggests that the channel through which female labor force participation raises a
man’s weight must be through a higher consumption of calories which is consistent with
a lower consumption of fruit and vegetables that we find associated with female demand
shocks for this group.
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